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In 1981 Chile adopted its new multi-pillar system, which featured privately managed individual 
accounts. Starting in 1983 payouts from the accounts were permitted and detailed rules about 
payouts were put in place. The Chilean scheme therefore gives us an opportunity to examine how 
pensioners and pension providers react to individual account systems during the payout stage and 
how regulations shape these reactions. We use aggregate time series data obtained from the 
pension fund and insurance industry regulators, individual-level data on all annuitants in the 
system, and interviews with pension providers and regulators for this analysis. 
 
Retirees in Chile have a choice between early versus normal retirement from the system and 
between annuitization versus programmed withdrawals (PW); lump sum withdrawals are largely 
ruled out. These choices determine the time stream of benefits and the eventual financial burden 
that will be placed on the public treasury. Almost twothirds of all retirees have annuitized, but 
this proportion differs greatly between early and normal age retirees. Currently 60% of all retirees 
have chosen to retire early, many before age 55. (Early retirement means that they stop 
contributing and start withdrawing; it does not mean that they stop working). Most (85% of) early 
retirees have annuitized, while most (66% of) normal age retirees have taken PW. We present 
evidence that this disparate behavior is explained by incentives and constraints stemming from 
guarantees and regulations on pensioners and pension providers. These rules have lead workers 
with small accumulations to take PW at the normal age, with the minimum pension guarantee 
providing longevity and investment insurance. They lead workers with large accumulations to 
retire early, with annuities providing insurance. Regulations have given insurance companies 
selling annuities a competitive advantage in marketing to this group, and they do so aggressively. 
 
Early access to retirement saving through early retirement or front-loaded PW imposes a potential 
financial burden on the government because of the minimum pension guarantee, which has been 
rising in real value through time. As a result, the expected public share of the total pension payout 
grows with a cohort’s age and may exceed expectations as cohorts that retired under the new 
system grow very old. Annuitization mitigates (but does not completely eliminate) this cost to the 
public treasury. This analysis suggests that, with appropriate incentives, a high proportion of 
pensioners will purchase annuities in countries with individual account systems. But these 
countries need to coordinate early withdrawal conditions with minimum pensions and other safety 
nets, in order to avoid moral hazard problems and unexpected public liabilities. 
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Payout Choices by Retirees in Chile: What Are They and Why? 
 
In 1981 Chile adopted its new multi-pillar system, which featured privately 
managed individual accounts. Traditional defined benefits for old age were eliminated in 
the new system. Starting in 1983 payouts from the accounts were permitted and detailed 
rules about payouts were put in place.  The Chilean scheme therefore gives us an 
opportunity to examine how pensioners and pension providers react when individual 
accounts replace DB systems, and how regulations shape these reactions. Much attention 
has previously focused on the accumulation stage, but this project is the first full analysis 
of the payout stage of the Chilean reform.  
Retirees in Chile make two key choices: between early versus normal retirement 
and between annuitization versus programmed withdrawals (PW). These choices 
determine the time stream of private benefits and the eventual financial burden that will 
be placed on the public treasury.  As life cycle models would predict in an environment 
with no DB, a high proportion of retirees have annuitized--—almost two-thirds over-all. 
This is a remarkable number, compared with the experience of other countries. But this 
proportion differs greatly between early and normal age retirees. Most workers retire as 
soon as they meet the eligibility conditions--60% of all pensioners have retired early, 
many before age 55. Most (85% of) early retirees have annuitized, while most (66% of) 
normal age retirees have taken PW. The central question this paper addresses—how do 
we explain this disparate behavior?  
Our main answer is—guarantees plus incentives and constraints stemming from 
regulations have shaped these choices.  Details of policies matter a lot. Pensioners and 
pension providers have made rational choices in light of these rules. The rules of the 
game have lead workers with small accumulations to maximize their retirement income 
by taking PW at the normal age, with the minimum pension guarantee (MPG) providing 
longevity and investment insurance. They lead workers with large accumulations to retire 
early, with annuities providing most of the insurance. With appropriate incentives, it 
appears that a high proportion of pensioners will purchase annuities. But in Chile these 
incentives include aggressive marketing by insurance companies and regulations that give 
these companies a competitive edge.  
Annuitization reduces but does not completely eliminate the government’s 
contingent liability. This liability stems mainly from a minimum pension guarantee that 
has been rising roughly on par with wages in the economy, in contrast to payouts from 
annuities or PW that remain constant or fall in real terms as the cohort ages. A secondary 
object of his paper is to identify the features of the system that may make this liability 
larger than expected. To address this question we examine the time stream of private 
pensions over the  retirement period and the public payments that this implies. 
We use three types of data sources: First, aggregate time series data on annuities 
and programmed withdrawals for normal old age and early retirement, 1983-2002, were 
obtained from the insurance regulator (SVS) and the AFP regulator (SAFP) (see 
Appendix for details). Second, we obtained from SVS individual-level data on all 
annuitants giving gender, size pensions and dates of birth, retirement and death. In this 
paper we use this data set to report descriptive statistics on annuitants, such as age of 
retirement, size of pension and expected versus actual mortality rates across groups. A 
forthcoming paper will analyze in greater detail the individual-level data on annuitants 
and insurance companies. Unfortunately, reliable individual-level data on PW pensioners 
were not available—which is itself part of the story. Third, we held extensive discussions 
with insurance companies, AFP’s and regulators in Santiago, and we obtained annuity 
quotes from several companies for 2003 and 1999, from which we calculated money’s 
worth ratios. 
Part I outlines the rules that shape pension payouts in Chile.  Parts II and III focus 
on the choices between annuities and PW and between early and normal retirement.  We 
examine choices by regulators who set the rules of the game and by pension providers 
and retiring workers who respond to these rules. We analyze who annuitizes and why? 
Who retires early and why? Part IV discusses implications for the government’s fiscal 
liability. The Conclusion presents lessons for the payout stage in other countries such as 
the US that have or are considering individual account systems.   
 
 
I The Rules of the Game: constraints and choices that shape the time-stream of 
pension payouts 
 
A major object of the accumulation stage of old age security programs is to 
prevent individuals from failing to save enough for their old age, so they later become a 
burden to the public treasury. One might expect that regulations at the payout stage 
would have a similar objective of delaying consumption to prevent individuals from 
outliving their savings. In particular, the existence of the minimum pension guarantee 
(MPG) in Chile raises a potential moral hazard problem and a contingent liability for 
government.  
At the same time, delaying consumption too much may result in over-saving. 
Allowing contributions to stop and withdrawals to start after adequate saving has been 
achieved prevents this from happening and may encourage older workers to stay in the 
labor force. It may mitigate pressures from unemployed older workers, who want access 
to their savings. This was an important factor in Chile during the 1980’s, when 
unemployment exceeded 10%. It reduces perverse redistributions from poor to rich and 
from unhealthy to healthy individuals that occur if everyone has to retire at the same age 
and annuitization with everyone in a common pool is required.   
Moreover, regulators may be subject to political pressures to allow front-loaded 
payouts, beyond the point that is justified by economic arguments. Empirical evidence 
from other countries indicates that some people are myopic, have a high discount rate 
and, for precautionary reasons, might prefer to hold their savings in a liquid form even if 
they don’t immediately consume it.  Allowing early access should increase the system’s 
popularity and induce workers to regard contributions as their own property rather than a 
tax. Furthermore, in Chile, where different bodies regulate AFP’s providing PW pensions 
versus insurance companies providing annuities, these regulators may face a trade-off 
between tight rules that prevent imprudence versus looser rules that give their industry a 
competitive advantage.   
This paper describes how regulators have walked this tightrope and how pension 
providers and pensioners have reacted to these regulations. Because of policies that 
postpone withdrawals and encourage annuitization, retirement accumulations should last 
the expected lifetimes of most workers; but because of policies that permit early access, 
with guarantees, many retirees who live longer than expected, and their surviving 
spouses, will pose a burden to the public treasury. 
The options 
Accumulations in the new Chilean pension system started in 1981 and retirement 
payouts were permitted from 1983 on. Payouts, like investments, are tightly 
circumscribed. Lump sum withdrawals are not permitted except under narrowly specified 
circumstances—the remaining accumulation must be large enough to produce a pension 
that is at least 70% of the worker’s average wage over the past ten years. Very few 
workers have met this requirement. Workers cannot access their funds for house 
purchase, education or medical expenses, as in some other countries.
1 Basically, workers 
must choose between annuitization versus programmed withdrawals (PW). It is an all-or-
nothing choice, with one company. The choice of annuities can be deferred 2-3 years 
through a program called “temporal withdrawals” and retirees who start with PW can 
switch to annuities later on.
2 Additionally, workers must choose their age of retirement, 
subject to eligibility conditions that will be described below. These are likely to be the 
kinds of choices that are offered in many reforming countries.  
The minimum pension guarantee (MPG) 
Regardless of the options chosen, government promises to keep the pension at or 
above the minimum pension guarantee (MPG). This guarantee is available to all workers 
who have contributed at least 20 years. If the worker’s own accumulation is not enough 
to cover a lifetime pension at the MPG level, the government provides a subsidy to bring 
it to that level. The MPG reduces the worker’s longevity risk from early access. But the 
reduced risk to the pensioner is matched by an increased risk to the public treasury, which 
is left with a contingent liability. The MPG is financed out of general revenues, not the 
payroll tax. To be eligible, workers must attest that they have no other income sources 
that bring them above the MPG level. This means test is enforced by the AFP’s or  
insurance companies paying the pension, which are required to secure documents from 
the tax authority and the old pension authority confirming the absence of other income.
3  
The MPG is set in nominal terms but it is reset in a political decision each year. 
During the 1980’s, real wages fell in Chile and then recovered. The MPG also fell and 
recovered, both with a lag. During the 1990’s real wages rose steadily and the MPG again 
rose more slowly but caught up by the end of the decade. Over the entire 21-year period, 
1981-2002, real wages rose by 50% while the MPG for retirees under age 70 rose by 41% 
and for those over age 70 it rose by 54% (Table 1 and Figure 1).  At the beginning of the 
period the MPG was about 25% of the average wage, by the end it was about 24%, while 
if it had remained constant in real value it would have fallen to 17% of the average wage 
and if constant in nominal value, to barely 1%. In this paper we refer to the MPG as 
roughly wage-indexed, although the relationship is ad hoc and irregular.  
When the MPG rises, it rises for the old stock of retires as well as the new flow. 
Thus it may ultimately apply to annuitants as well as to pensioners on PW. It jumps by 
about 9% for workers once they reach the age of 70. It is reduced for early retirees, by a 
formula described below.  This reduction, based on age of retirement from the pension 
system, means that the MPG is very individual-specific—which in the long run may 
make it difficult to track and enforce.  The MPG also applies to survivors’ benefits—
supposedly at 60% of the full MPG but, because of special adjustments, actually 100%.   
Choice of annuities vs. PW 
Under annuitization workers turn their entire accumulation over to an insurance 
company that provides the annuity, subject to detailed rules set by the insurance regulator 
(the Superintendencia de Valores y Seguros—SVS).  The retiree foregoes future control 
over investments and gives up the right to leave bequests (except for that embodied in a 
joint or guaranteed period annuity), but gets a stable income stream that is guaranteed for 
life.  Regulations require that annuities should be fixed rate rather than variable, price-
indexed and joint with 60% to surviving spouse for married men.  If the MPG rises above 
the annuity level, the government tops up the payout. The government also insures 75% 
of the worker’s annuity over the MPG (with a cap of UF 43 or about US$1000 monthly) 
in case the insurance company becomes insolvent, and to prevent this from happening 
sets stringent reserve, equity and asset-liability matching requirements (discussed in a  
separate paper). So far it has never had to pay this insurance but it is likely to do so for 
the first time as a result of the recent Inverlink scandal.
4 Subject to meeting regulatory 
requirements, insurance companies determine annuity payouts and bear the longevity and 
interest rate risk. They are not permitted to charge explicit fees, but cover their costs and 
profits out of implicit fees (the spread between the rate of return they earn on investments 
versus the rate they pay annuitants) that are based on the total assets used to purchase the 
annuity (See James, Song and Vittas 2003 for a discussion of the role of the spread in 
annuity pricing in other countries as well). 
Under programmed withdrawals (PW) the permissible withdrawal per year from 
the worker’s account depends on a formula that is set by law. Its key arguments are the 
assumed mortality and interest rates. Workers retain control and bequest rights over the 
remainder of their accumulation, subject to regulatory constraints. Their investments may 
lose money and even if they don’t the pension is likely to decline dramatically through 
time, due to the way the formula works (discussed below). If the PW payout hits the 
MPG, payouts stay at the MPG level until the account is used up, at which point the 
government pays the entire pension bill. Like annuities, PW pensions must be joint for 
married men (and for women with dependent children). The same companies (AFPs) that 
manage investments during the accumulation stage, manage it during the PW stage, 
subject to rules established by the AFP regulator (the Superintendencia de AFP--SAFP). 
AFP’s have no control over the formula that determines PW payouts nor do they bear the 
mortality and interest rate risk the formula implies. In contrast to insurance companies, 
AFP’s are required to make all fees explicit and all investment earnings must be passed 
on to pensioners. Their revenues depend primarily on contribution-based fees during the 
accumulation stage, secondarily on small fees per account or per payout amount during 
the withdrawal stage. 
One sub-group of retirees does not have a choice between annuities and PW: 
those whom, upon retirement, do not have an accumulation large enough to purchase an 
annuity at or above the MPG floor must stay in PW and spend down their savings at the 
MPG level each month, after which the government pays the full bill. PW pensioners can 
also become subject to this restriction some years after retirement, hitting the floor as the  
PW payout goes down while the MPG goes up. As of 2003, 70% of all PW pensioners 
(or 24% of all retirees) were in this no-choice situation.  
In sum, under annuities pensioners get a fixed payout, pay no fees except that 
which is implicitly embodied in this payout and insurance companies get the varying 
residual, while under PW AFP’s get a fixed explicit fee and pensioners get the varying 
residual. Both groups receive ultimate protection from the MPG. Almost two-thirds of all 
pensioners have annuitized and they constitute about three-quarters of those who had a 
choice at their date of retirement (Table 2 and Figure 2). 
Choice between normal and early retirement age 
Besides this choice between PW and annuitization, workers must also choose the 
age at which they will begin to withdraw their money from the system. Normal 
retirement age is 65 for men, 60 for women. After this age any worker may begin 
withdrawing funds. But starting in 1987 regulations began to facilitate earlier 
withdrawals. Early retirement is permitted once workers have an accumulation large 
enough to finance a pension that is 110% (soon to be 130%) of the MPG and 50% of their 
own average wage. For workers who qualify, continued saving through the social security 
system becomes voluntary rather than mandatory.  It is important to note that “early 
retirement from the system” does not mean “retirement from the labor force;” it only 
means that workers start withdrawing from and may stop contributing to their retirement 
accounts. In fact, the elimination of the 13% payroll tax may have a positive impact on 
the labor supply of older workers.
5  But the fact that workers can stop accumulating has a 
negative impact on their future pensions and the finances of the government.  Among 
current pensioners, 60% retired early, often before the age of 55 (Tables 3 and Figure 3).
6 
Indexation requirement   
In Chile, both nominal and price-indexed currencies (pesos versus UF’s) are in 
common use, and long-term financial transactions are usually quoted in the latter—a 
consequence of Chile’s long experience with inflation. Regulations require annuities to 
be issued in UF’s.  Initial benefits are lower than they would have been otherwise, but 
later on the nominal value increases with inflation to maintain a constant purchasing 
power.  In nominal terms annuity values are therefore back-loaded while in real terms 
values are constant over time. A nominal annuity issued in 1993 in Chile would have  
fallen to only 63% of its initial real value by 2002, and one issued in 1983 would have 
fallen to 5% of its initial real value by 2002. Price indexation avoids this problem of 
falling real values. Price indexation of annuities saves the government considerable 
money, since nominal annuities are more front-loaded in real value and will quickly fall 
below a price-indexed MPG. With nominal annuities, the individual would keep an early 
surplus above the MPG, while the treasury would pay the difference once the pension 
falls below a constant real MPG. Chile avoids this problem. (However, it faces a similar 
but smaller problem since the MPG has been rising with wages, while annuities are 
indexed only to prices.  We discuss this further below).   
Monthly payouts from PW are also price-indexed in the sense that they are 
specified in UF’s for a 12-month period and most of the investments backing them are 
price-indexed. However, PW valuations are recalculated every 12 months and, as 
discussed below, the formula yields a declining real value over the retiree’s lifetime. This 
increases the probability that the MPG will eventually be hit. 
Joint pension requirement 
Benefits are also postponed by the requirement of joint annuities and joint PW. 
Married men who annuitize must use joint annuities, with the surviving widow receiving 
at least 60% of the husband’s annuity (50% to widow +15% to each child if there are 
surviving children). The formula for PW, too, includes a provision for the wife to receive 
60% of the deceased husband’s pension and this provision diminishes the amount that the 
husband can withdraw.
7  This requirement provides insurance for widows, financed by 
their husbands, rather than the public treasury. In effect, husbands must put aside some of 
their retirement savings to cover benefits to their wives, who are likely to be younger and 
outlive them. (Wives, in contrast, must purchase individual annuities or PW, unless they 
have disabled husbands or dependent children). If the wife is 5 years younger than the 
husband and has a life expectancy that is 3 years greater than his—the typical case in 
Chile--this requirement reduces his monthly payout by about 17% (Table 5; also see 
James, Edwards and Wong 2003). While many husbands would have chosen the joint 
annuity option voluntarily, some might have purchased an individual annuity in the 
absence of this requirement because they place a greater value on their own consumption. 
The wife is allowed to keep this joint pension in addition to her own pension, if she has  
worked. The mandatory joint annuity or PW saves the government money since, together 
with her own pension, it often brings the income of the surviving wife above the MPG 
point for working wives or the social assistance point for non-working wives.
8  
 
II. Programmed Withdrawals versus Annuitization for Normal Old Age Retirees 
  
A key choice for retirees in Chile is whether to annuitize or take programmed 
withdrawals. If the individual chooses to annuitize she buys her annuity from an 
insurance company, which provides longevity and investment insurance. If she takes PW 
she leaves her money with her AFP, which calculates a stream of monthly withdrawals 
based on a formula set by the AFP regulator. The MPG is the only longevity and 
investment insurance she receives. In both cases key ingredients into the determination of 
payouts are mortality tables assumed and interest rates in the economy at the time the 
person retires. We analyze how they affect the “money’s worth ratio” for annuities, the 
time stream of payouts under PW, and the choice between them in the context of the 
MPG.  
Annuities—the high money’s worth ratio 
Annuities in Chile provide a level real pension for the annuitant’s lifetime (plus 
the lifetime of survivors for joint annuities). When an insurance company sells an 
annuity, it computes this level pension, taking into account the expected lifetime of the 
individual (and spouse) and the investment returns it expects to earn with the premium. 
Do the resulting payouts provide good value to Chilean workers?  This will obviously 
influence their willingness to purchase an annuity. Hence, we start by presenting our 
calculations on the MWR of annuities in Chile.  
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  where:   T  = Maximum attainable age  
      a   = Age (in years) of annuitant at start of contract 
      t  = Number of months beyond annuity starting date  
   P a,t = Probability of individual being alive t months after age a 
   A a  = Monthly annuity payment for annuity purchased at age a 
   C a  = Cost of policy for individual purchasing annuity at age a 
   i t  = Nominal monthly t-period spot rate  
 
  The numerator of this expression is the expected present discounted value of 
the lifetime income stream from the annuity, while the denominator Ca is the initial 
capital cost. If the MWR is 100%, this means that consumers can expect to get back what 
they paid in, in addition to longevity and investment insurance. If the MWR is 
considerably less than 100% (a high load factor), consumers are getting back a lot less 
than they put in, and this may not be a good deal for them. If it is much greater than 
100%, this raises the prospect that insurance companies are offering too much in order to 
gain market share in the short run and may not be able to keep their promises in the long 
run; possibly regulators should be concerned.  
Discount rates. We surveyed several insurance companies in March 1999 and 
March 2003, computed the average payout in each year for several annuity products, and 
calculated the MWR using two different discount rates--the risk-free term structure and a 
risky term structure. The term structure is used to take account of the fact that annuity 
payouts flow at different points in time, throughout the annuitant’s life. The risk-free rate 
is based on 0 coupon  bonds in 2003 and is derived from PRC paper of differing 
maturities in 1999 (0 coupon bonds did not exist in 1999). The risky rate is defined as 
risk-free + 1.4%, which is approximately what insurance companies in Chile have earned, 
on average per year, over the past decade. The risk-free discount rate is most appropriate 
for workers who want a secure source of retirement income and consider annuities safe. 
The risky rate is most appropriate for workers who have a higher subjective time 
preference or who are willing to accept some investment risk in exchange for a higher 
expected return.  
Mortality tables. We employ several mortality tables in our analysis: 1) 1985 
mortality tables, RV85, are used by the insurance and AFP regulators. They are period 
rather than cohort tables; that is, they are based on cross-sectional data and do not take 
into account expected future longevity improvements.  And they are based on old cross-
sections (prior to 1985), hence do not even take full account of past longevity  
improvements.  They likely underestimate life expectancy of workers, especially those in 
the formal sector who are covered by Chile’s social security system. 2) 1998 period 
tables with lower mortality (RV98) have been developed based on more recent data with 
pensioners but are not yet used by regulators.  3) we constructed a cohortized version of 
RV98, using the Canadian mortality improvement factor as a proxy. Life expectancy for 
males at age 65 is 80.5 in RV85, 82 in RV98 and 83 for the cohortized version of RV98. 
Our analysis of actual mortality experience for annuitants indicates that RV85 understates 
longevity for men and women and therefore understates insurance company liabilities. 
RV98 continues to understate longevity for women, but by a smaller amount, and 
overstates longevity of men, especially men who retired early, although this 
overstatement largely disappears by the late 1990’s (Table 4).  We do not have data that 
would allow us to assess which table is most accurate for PW pensioners. (See James and 
Song 2001, James, Song and Vittas 2003 for a more detailed discussion about mortality 
tables and the role they play in annuity markets). 
Summary of MWR’s. Competition has brought the MWR discounted at the risk-
free rate to the neighborhood of 100% in many countries. This appears to be the case in 
Chile also. According to Table 5, Panel A:   
1)  For male annuitants who retire at age 65, whose mortality is best represented 
by RV98, the risk-free MWR is close to 100%. This means that the typical annuitant gets 
back the present value of his premium over his lifetime, in addition to the insurance value 
of the annuity.  
2)  For the average population member, whose expected mortality may be closer 
to RV85, the MWR is 3-5% lower. If forced to annuitize at current payout rates these 
individuals are unlikely to recoup their full premiums. This lower MWR helps to explain 
why some people do not purchase annuities. The PW option allows this group to avoid 
the negative redistributions that would result under these terms.  
3)  For workers who retire and annuitize at an earlier age, such as 55, the MWR 
falls by about 4%--possibly due to the higher risk premium that insurance companies 
charge for their longer period of exposure and greater reinvestment and longevity risk.  
4)  The measured MWR is lower for women, probably because they are viewed 
as posing greater longevity risk. (Table 4 shows that, indeed, they live longer than 
expected in any of these tables, so actual MWR exceeds measured MWR). 
5)  Joint annuities, which prevail in Chile, have lower payouts but similar 
MWR’s to individual annuities. They narrow the MWR disparity between retirees with 
long and short expected lifetimes, because they involve two individuals with non-
correlated lifetimes. 
Table 5, Panel B compares MWR under various scenarios and shows that: 
1)  Using the risky discount rate reduces the MWR by about 11%. Individuals for 
whom the risky rate is appropriate place a lower value on the current limited annuity 
options, and would be more likely to annuitize if other options, such as variable annuities, 
were permitted. 
2)  A higher premium might be expected to reduce the measured MWR because 
insurance companies believe high premium retirees will have greater expected lifetimes 
due to the wealth-longevity correlation, and therefore offer lower monthly payouts per 
dollar of premium. Working in the opposite direction, payouts and MWR might be higher 
because administrative costs of annuities tend to be fixed per policy, hence a lower 
percentage of premium for larger accounts (see below for further discussion). Our data 
indicate that the latter effect dominates and MWR’s are slightly higher for larger 
premiums. 
3)  Payouts declined more than 10% between 1999 and 2003 but the MWR did 
not fall—in fact it rose slightly over this period. Apparently payouts have not yet fallen 
enough to fully compensate for the dramatically falling short term interest rates over this 
period, perhaps because most investments are made in longer term securities (see below). 
The MWR’s in Chile are especially high given that they hold for price-indexed 
annuities. This contrasts with most other countries, where only nominal annuities are 
offered.
9 Insurance companies are usually reluctant to offer price-indexed annuities 
because indexed investment instruments with which to hedge this risk are not available or 
pay a low rate of return. Also, if indexation is voluntary, it is more likely to be chosen by 
retirees with greater expected longevity--adding to their expected cost. If insurance 
companies do offer indexed annuities they impose a high price (in the form of a low  
money’s worth ratio) for these reasons. For example, the MWR that annuitants receive 
for indexed annuities is 89% in the UK compared with 98% for nominal annuities (see 
Murthie et al 1999; also see Finkelstein and Poterba, 1999 and 2000). However, we find 
that the MWR to annuitants for indexed annuities in Chile is 98% (using RV98). Indexed 
annuities cost less in Chile, possibly because many inflation-indexed investment 
instruments are available for investment by insurance companies and because indexation 
is mandated, hence adverse selection is not an issue. (For further discussion of the MWR 
in other countries see James and Song 2001, James, Song and Vittas 2003).  
Importance of the “spread.” How do insurance companies manage to cover their 
costs and profits while repaying the full premium and providing longevity and investment 
insurance to annuitants?  Elsewhere we have argued that they can do so because they earn 
a spread between the risk-free rate that they pay annuitants and the risky rate that they 
earn on the diversified portfolios in which they invest the premiums (James, Song and 
Vittas 2003). These portfolios include long-term public and corporate bonds, mortgage-
backed securities, and some equities. The risk inherent in these securities is converted 
into less risky annuities by risk-intermediating measures such as investment 
diversification, use of derivatives, reinsurance, negative correlations among product lines, 
keeping reserves that exceed liabilities, using shareholder net worth as buffers, and 
ultimately, government guarantees. Term intermediation is also used, to a limited 
extent—investing in long term instruments, whose rates have not fallen nearly as much as 
short-term rates, while covering short term payouts out of cash inflows. In addition, 
insurance companies earn a premium owing to their capacity to invest in illiquid 
instruments. As a result of these measures, in Chile the spread between the rates paid and 
earned has exceeded 1.4% per year, which is enough to cover their costs (Table 6 and 
Figure 4)   The net result is a MWR of annuities that make them a reasonable option for 
retirees.  
PW—payouts start high and decline with age   
If a retiree chooses a programmed withdrawal (PW) instead of annuitization, she 
leaves her money with the AFP and takes a withdrawal each month, based on a specified 
formula. PWs do not provide longevity and reinvestment insurance. However, they do 
have five basic advantages: they allow the retiree to:   
(1) Be sure that he and his heirs will receive back the full value of his 
accumulation, regardless of when he dies. This may be valuable to workers who do not 
want to forego any of the money in their accounts to purchase insurance. 
(2) Choose the investment strategy (choice of AFP and, more recently, portfolio). 
This enables pensioners to invest in a riskier portfolio with a higher return than annuities. 
(3) Leave bequests if the worker dies early. Any remaining amount in the account 
that exceeds the capital needed to finance the joint pension is left to heirs instead of being 
kept in the annuity pool. 
(4) Get her money out of the system quickly. During the first few years of 
retirement, the PW formula produces payouts that exceed annuity payouts, and then vice 
versa, due to the required mortality and interest rate assumptions. 
(5) Switch to an annuity if desired later on, whereas the choice of an annuity is 
irreversible.  
The disadvantage to the government is that PW pensioners may withdraw more than the 
MPG level in the early years of retirement and become a cost to the treasury in their later 
years. Regulations exacerbate these effects. 
PW formula. The PW formula for an individual pension is  
Premium = 12*p*prem + EPV(UF15), where:  
Premium = retiree’s total accumulation 
p = monthly pension, whose value is being ascertained by this formula  
prem = EPV of pension that equals 1 UF monthly = (Nx/Dx – 11/24)  
Nx and Dx are standard actuarial factors that depend on mortality and interest 
rates 
EPV(UF15) = expected present value of UF15, which is the necessary capital 
for the funeral benefit of Chilean UF15 that must be included in all policies 
In the common case of a joint withdrawal, in determining prem enough capital must be 
set aside to cover 60% of p for the surviving spouse, as well as p for the pensioner, so 
prem = (Nx/Dx - 11/24) + .6(Ny/Dy – Nxy/Dxy).  
This is exactly the same as the formula for an actuarially fair annuity (with 
MWR=100%). That is, if insurance companies and AFPs use the same term structure of 
interest rates and mortality tables, annuities and PW will yield the same pension, P1, in  
year 1. A level annuity will continue to pay P1 through the lifetime of the retiree and 
similarly, under PW there should be enough money in the worker’s account to pay P1 
until her expected age of death, if expected investment returns are realized.   
However, the PW payout is recalculated every year. Unless the investment return 
is much higher than expected, the PW pension in year 2 will decline, because the 
expected life span increases for pensioners who have survived an additional year; and so 
on for successive years (Figure 5). Eventually the PW pension falls below the MPG. This 
point comes sooner if the MPG is wage-indexed rather than price-indexed. At that point 
the PW formula is discarded and a pension at the MPG level is paid from the account 
until the accumulation is exhausted, after which the government takes over and pays the 
entire MPG. This means that the MPG provides longevity insurance for those who live 
longer than expected and investment insurance for those whose returns are lower than 
expected.
10 In contrast, an annuity that starts out above the MPG level will never fall 
below a price-indexed MPG.  (The annuity may, however, eventually fall below a wage-
indexed MPG, in which case the government tops it up to the incremented floor—a much 
smaller fiscal obligation than under PW).  
The basic reason for the decline in PW relative to annuity payouts and the 
eventual exhaustion of accumulations under PW (even when mortality and interest rate 
assumptions are accurate), is that leakage to bequests outside the pool occurs for PW 
pensioners while all retirement savings are kept within the pool of annuitants.  For 
annuitants the cost of high longevity individuals is covered by assets left in the annuity 
pool by those who die early, while when a PW pensioner dies his remaining capital goes 
to his heirs and does not enhance the pool for surviving pensioners.  
Additional front-loading of PW due to mortality and interest rate assumptions. 
The allowable PW depends heavily on the mortality table and interest rate structure used 
in the calculation, and these are specified by the AFP regulator. When these are higher, 
the initial allowable PW payout is higher—PW becomes more front-loaded. But if these 
are overstated, the retiree’s accumulation is used up faster than it would otherwise. This 
risk of exaggerated mortality and interest rates is passed on to workers and, eventually, to 
the public treasury.   
Currently the AFP regulator requires that RV85 be used as the mortality tables for 
PW payouts. We showed earlier that RV85 overstates mortality rates for annuitants. The 
AFP Supervisor argues that it is more applicable to the PW population, which includes 
many low earners with low accumulations, who are forced by regulations to take PW. 
However, mortality data are not available for PW pensioners that would allow us (or the 
SAFP) to test this hypothesis.
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Interest rate assumptions are another key ingredient in the PW formula. Initially a 
0 future return was built into the formula, but this was deemed implausible and it 
produced very low pension payouts. In 1987 the regulator changed this to a positive real 
interest rate to improve payouts—80% based on the previous year’s internal rate of return 
on new annuities and 20% based on the AFP’s average real return over the last ten years 
(a number that varies by AFP).
12 Since AFP returns were extremely high during the 
1980’s and early 1990’s, while interest rates on annuities (and other investments) have 
been falling recently, this produces an assumed interest rate for PW that is about .5-1.0 
percentage points higher than the current annuity rate. Table 6 compares the internal rate 
of return on annuities, the annual average rate of return on AFP and insurance company 
investment portfolios, the rate on the 20-year PRC bond (with a duration of about 8.5 
years) and the PW interest rate assumption, between 1988-2001. We see that the twenty-
year AFP average return, 1981-2001, was 10.7% and the ten-year average AFP return, 
1993-2002, was 7%, while the internal rate of return on old age annuities has mostly 
ranged between 5 and 5.5%. All these rates have been falling in recent years, with the 
higher AFP returns in the past pulling up the applicable rate used to determine PW 
payouts.  
The expected return on PW should be higher than the return on a fixed rate 
annuity, given that the portfolios are more risky, they are invested partially in equities, 
and pensioners assume some of this risk.
13 Indeed, one reason for choosing PW is its 
higher expected return, with the pensioner benefiting from any upside gain and protected 
from downside loss by the MPG.  But the risk-adjusted return (to pensioner + treasury)  
should be the same for PW’s and annuities—raising the question of whether expected or 
risk-adjusted return should be used in the PW formula. Additionally, this backward-
looking method of imputing AFP returns may overestimate expected future returns, in a  
context when interest rates in the economy are falling. Such an overestimate would 
increase the PW pension in the early years, but the larger withdrawal as well as the 
smaller investment return that is actually earned would reduce the retiree’s accumulation 
and pension in later years—until the MPG is reached.
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Incentives for accurate mortality and interest rate assumptions—AFP’s vs. 
insurance companies. It appears that no one (except for the treasury) has an incentive to 
test or change these possibly inaccurate assumptions. AFP’s have no incentive to collect 
and analyze mortality data or to press for more forward-looking rate of return 
assumptions since they do not bear the longevity or investment risk. These assumptions 
make PW look more attractive to workers, hence keep customers in the AFP industry. 
Workers have no incentive to question this choice of mortality tables or interest rates 
since it enables them to get their money out sooner.  Moreover, both workers and 
survivors are protected by the MPG, which cuts their potential losses from overly-
optimistic assumptions.  Therefore, the mortality and interest assumptions under PW 
continue in use, without empirical testing or political challenge, although they may 
eventually impose costs on the government.   
The insurance regulator also uses the 1985 mortality tables to determine reserve 
requirements of companies selling annuities. The use of high mortality tables reduces the 
insurance companies’ reserve requirements and equity costs.  This may weaken their 
solvency in the long run but it increases the rate of return to owners in the short run, so 
they, too, are reluctant to change. However, insurance companies have the right to set 
their own payouts and loads and are likely to construct and use more accurate mortality 
tables for this purpose. Since they bear the longevity risk and will have to come up with 
the money when annuitants live longer than expected, they are sensitive to the dangers of 
overestimating mortality. Therefore, they collect their own company data on survival and 
deaths of annuitants and analyze data for the industry as a whole, made available by the 
insurance regulator (which is why data on annuitants were available to us but reliable 
data on PW pensioners were not available). Our discussions with insurance company 
managers suggest that the tables they have constructed for pricing purposes are similar to 
the more conservative 1998 tables. As we have seen, the observed payouts yield a 
money’s worth ratio for normal age retirees of around 98% using RV98 period and 101%  
using our cohortized version (Table 5). If companies had used the less conservative RV85 
and competition kept loads low, this would have yielded higher payouts but companies 
might have encountered solvency problems down the road.  
The fact that insurance companies bear the investment risk also gives them a 
strong incentive to use forward-looking market rates in setting payouts on their annuity 
contracts. Our money’s worth calculations for 2003 compared with 1999 show that they 
are very responsive to changes in interest rates, adjusting payouts quickly to hold the 
MWR’s roughly constant. Furthermore, insurance companies largely immunize 
themselves to unexpected changes in interest rates by matching the duration of assets and 
liabilities and this is encouraged by regulations;
15 but PW pensioners who must buy into 
an AFP portfolio designed for workers still in the accumulation stage, cannot do so.  
It is quite possible that some insurance company managers will be short-sighted 
and make high mortality and interest rate assumptions that permit high monthly payouts, 
in order to maximize their business in the short run. If these companies become insolvent 
in the long run, many annuitants will be in serious trouble, as will the government given 
its partial guarantee of the annuity.  However, information and regulations are designed 
to remedy this situation long before that point is reached. When realized investment 
returns and mortality rates are below the assumed rates, this raises the present value of 
insurance liabilities and reduces asset values. Regulations then require that additional 
owner-equity be placed into the reserves. This cost to owners discourages overly 
optimistic assumptions and encourages medium-term corrections such as the use of more 
realistic terms on new policies. Thus, insurance companies face incentives and 
regulations that induce them to improve their assumptions and limit the treasury’s 
contingent obligations, while AFP’s have no incentive (or power) to improve these 
assumptions. 
Which workers choose annuities versus PW at the normal retirement age?  
Among normal age retirees, who chooses to annuitize and who takes PW? We 
hypothesize that the biggest predictor of choice between annuities and PW is size of 
accumulation. In part this is due to compulsion. If the accumulation is too small to 
purchase an annuity at least as great as the MPG upon retirement, such workers are 
required to take PW with a payout equal to the MPG until they use up their accumulation,  
at which point the government steps in to pay the bill. But even among those who have 
choice, we would expect retirees with smaller accumulations to take PW, because this 
maximizes their expected lifetime income without adding to their risk in the presence of 
the MPG, while workers with larger accumulations are relatively more likely to choose 
annuitization because of its insurance value. 
Consider a retiree whose accumulation is just large enough to purchase an annuity 
at the MPG level (4.46UF). By choosing PW he maximizes his potential bequest to his 
heirs. In the absence of the MPG he would risk a dramatically fallilng pension for 
himself. But the MPG avoids this outcome. Indeed, if PW payouts are front-loaded due to 
higher mortality and interest rate assumptions this also gives him an initial pension (of 
5.05UF) > MPG; yet his pension can never fall below MPG. Thus, he enjoys a higher 
expected lifetime retirement income plus a higher income to his heirs under PW than 
under annuitization, which gives him a constant payout = MPG (see Figure 6 and 
simulations in Table 12A).
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Ordinarily we would predict that low income workers will get substantial utility 
from avoiding the longevity and interest rate risk inherent in PW, and this might 
outweigh its higher expected income. However, the MPG completely protects this worker 
from the downside of investment and longevity risk—and converts this risk into a benefit. 
If rates of return should rise he collects the gain, while if interest rates fall the 
government takes over sooner (he therefore will choose the riskiest investments 
available). If he dies young, his heirs collect the remainder in his accounts, while if he 
lives long the government pays the bill.  In contrast, as an annuitant he would get no 
front-loading in the early years, no chance at higher returns, and no bequest to heirs. 
Thus, he is unambiguously better off choosing PW. Importantly, this holds true 
regardless of whether he expects his life span to be high or low—that is, asymmetrical 
information about mortality does not change his choice.  
In contrast, consider a pensioner whose initial accumulation is large enough to 
purchase an annuity that is 200% or more of the MPG. He, too, gets a larger payout in the 
early years from the front-loaded PW than he would from an annuity (10.09 vs. 8.92UF). 
And if he dies young his heirs receive the remainder in his account. However, if he lives 
long his PW pension eventually falls all the way to the MPG level (4.87UF after age 70 if  
MPG is price-indexed), which is far less than he would have gotten as an annuitant. PW 
therefore maximizes his lifetime income if he expects a short life span, but annuitization 
maximizes it if he expects a long lifetime. And if interest rates plummet, his pension 
plummets under PW. Thus, this worker pays a price for his higher expected income and 
bequest rights in the early years—his price is the difference between his declining and 
volatile PW pension buttressed by the relatively low MPG in the later years versus the 
constant annuity he could have purchased.  A wage-indexed MPG reduces this price 
because it raises the floor that is financed by the treasury. However, even a wage-indexed 
MPG that grows at 2% annually will not protect his full annuity value until he is 96 years 
old.   Therefore, workers with large accumulations are more likely to annuitize, unless 
they expect to be very short-lived or are very anxious to leave bequests (Figure 7 and 
Table 12A).  
Workers whose accumulations are large enough to finance an annuity that is 
between 100% and 200% of the MPG will fall somewhere in-between these two 
extremes. In general, a larger accumulation should lead toward annuitization and should 
make expected mortality rates more relevant to selection, for all the reasons given. 
Evidence on mortality rates among annuitants is presented in the following section.  
This line of reasoning leads us to expect that most PW pensions will be clustered 
at or very close to the MPG, while most annuities will be well above the MPG. In fact, 
this is exactly what we find. The average payout among normal retirees in PW has been 
hovering around the MPG point since the system began (Table 7). Moreover, the vast 
majority of PW recipients (79% of normal old age pensioners and 77% of widows) are 
now at the MPG floor (Table 8). (These pensioners might have had the annuity option 
when they initially retired, but it is no longer available to them as their PW has fallen 
while the MPG level has risen). Most of these pensioners are currently drawing down 
their own accumulations, and once their balances are exhausted the government will step 
in and pay the full pension. This contrasts with annuitants, whose average payout is 
almost double the MPG (almost treble for the new inflow of annuitants). Three-quarters 
of normal old age annuitants have pensions above the MPG level (Tables 7 and 9).  And 
among those below the MPG, only a small minority qualify for the top-up, hence are 
subject to moral hazard (Table 10).
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Overall, the majority of normal old age retirees have small accumulations and 
pensions in the neighborhood of the MPG. Two-thirds—the ones with the smallest 
payouts--take (or are force to take) PW--while one-third with much larger payouts choose 
annuitization. This sharp bifurcation suggests that Chilean workers are responding 
rationally to the incentives created by the MPG and these incentives make size of 
accumulation a major predictor of choice.  
 
III. Normal versus Early Retirement 
 
When the Chilean system was first established, retirement age was specified as 
age 65 for men, 60 for women. Early retirement was also permitted—providing the 
accumulation met a specified minimum. Early retirement does not mean that the worker 
had to stop working. It simply means that he or she could stop contributing and start 
withdrawing.  On the one hand, eliminating the mandatory contribution at an early age 
prevents over-saving and may increase the labor supply of older workers.  But on the 
other hand, it may leave many early retirees with low incomes in very old age. The rising 
MPG may eventually overtake the pensions of early retirees, thereby imposing a potential 
cost on the treasury.  
Early retirement conditions were stringent at the beginning of the new system, but 
were loosened during the 1980’s. Simultaneously, regulations have given insurance 
companies selling annuities a competitive edge in selling annuities to early retirees. The 
net result is that a majority (60%) of pensioners have retired early and an overwhelming 
proportion of early retirees (85%) have annuitized. This mitigates but does not 
completely eliminate the dangers of low incomes for the very old and a high contingent 
public liability.  
Regulations facilitating early retirement  
Eased preconditions. Initially early retirement was allowed only if the worker 
could acquire a pension that was 100% of the MPG and 70% of his own average wage 
over the past 10 years—a condition that was very difficult to meet. However, that 
situation changed in 1987, when easier conditions for early retirement were specified. By 
1987 many workers had sizeable accumulations in their new accounts, due to their 10% net contributions since 1981, real rates of return that exceeded 12% during the 1980’s and 
recognition bonds that they received for service prior to 1981. Unemployment rates 
exceeded 10%, many older workers had lost their jobs, and it was difficult to deny them 
access to their money, especially if they became unemployed.
18 Consequently, in 1987 
the replacement rate requirement was reduced to 50% of own wage but the MPG 
requirement was increased to 110%.
19   In making this calculation nominal wages are 
indexed up by price growth and months without wages are averaged in as 0’s, so 
unemployment (whether voluntary or involuntary) helps a worker to qualify. Also, 
starting in 1987 employers who wished to facilitate a worker’s early retirement could put 
extra money into his retirement account.  
Tradable bonos de reconocimiento and complements. Early retirement, as well as 
the development of the annuity market more generally, was facilitated by the fact that 
Chile paid workers recognition bonds (bonos de reconocimiento) in return for their 
contributions to the old system prior to 1981.
20  Initially the bonos were illiquid until the 
normal retirement age, but starting in 1987 workers were allowed to sell these bonos to 
insurance companies as part of the premium for an early retirement annuity. In contrast, 
AFP’s could not buy bonos until 1990, which greatly hampered their ability to compete 
in the early retirement market.
21  At first insurance companies had to hold the bonos until 
they matured at the worker’s normal retirement age. In 1990 this rule was changed and 
workers were allowed to sell the bonos to anybody, making them tradable at the 
securities exchange. This produced a market value for the bonos, reduced their liquidity 
and political risk and raised their price. Also in 1987 government created “complements” 
to the bono--additional funds for affiliates who retired in the first ten years of the new 
pension scheme. The worker’s ability to include the bono and the complement as part of 
the early retirement premium, and the company’s ability to trade in the bono, were key 
regulatory choices that enhanced access to early retirement.  
Regulatory advantages to insurance companies 
Brokers’ commissions. Besides the initial advantage insurance companies had in 
purchasing bonos, other regulations gave them an additional competitive edge. These 
pertained to pricing rules and brokers’ commissions.  Insurance companies have a large 
network of independent brokers to whom they pay sales commissions, while AFPs are  
not allowed to pay commissions to independent brokers. Hence, workers who visit or are 
visited by a financial adviser to explore their options (as most do while considering early 
retirement) are likely to be steered toward insurance companies and annuities. Since 
brokers’ commissions are usually a function of premium size, they will be most interested 
in marketing to retirees with large accumulations.  
Pricing rules. Insurance companies in Chile are not permitted to charge explicit 
fees for annuities. Instead, they can only quote a monthly payout and must cover their 
costs and profits from the “spread” between rate paid to annuitants and the rate earned on 
a diversified portfolio of investments. We have estimated that this spread is about 1.4% 
per year of assets, enough to cover their costs. But this “price” is implicit and hidden, and 
might not even be recognized as a price by potential customers. These revenues are asset-
based and rise with assets, while administrative costs tend to fall with assets, due to 
transactions costs associated with the MPG. Thus, workers with large accumulations are 
particularly attractive to insurance companies. 
In contrast, regulations require that all AFP fees must be explicit. Regulations also 
require that the entire investment return must be passed on to the owner of the account by 
the AFP’s. Pensioners have large assets compared with workers, but asset-based fees are 
ruled out. AFP’s are permitted to charge fees based on new contributions during the 
accumulation stage (this is their major source of income), on payouts during the pension 
stage, and a flat fee per account. Behavioral economics tells us that labels and framing 
matter. It is quite possible that workers place a heavier weight on explicit fees that they 
see than on implicit fees that appear to be zero; they may not even be aware of the latter.  
In that case, pensioners would choose annuity products sold by insurance companies 
rather than PW pensions sold by AFP’s.  
Initially AFP’s did not charge any fee for retirees. Since 2002, as the number of 
pensioners has grown, AFP’s began to charge small monthly fees of 1-1.25% of payout 
amounts. We estimate that the monthly fee per pensioner is about one-third that per 
worker. Assuming that administrative costs per month are similar for the two groups, 
retirees are hardly covering their costs while workers are very profitable to AFP’s.
22  It is 
somewhat puzzling that AFP’s have failed to price at a more profitable level. The fact 
that insurance companies charge invisible implicit fees may set a low competitive limit  
on the fees that AFP’s can charge while staying in the market. Additionally, AFP’s may 
fear that high fees on pensioners will call attention to the substantial profits they are 
already making on contributing workers, and will stimulate political backlash to control 
the latter. Pensioners might object to paying the AFP to get their money out, after they 
already paid to put it in. The outcome of these pricing regulations, political pressures and 
constraints on brokers commissions seems to be that AFP’s have little interest in shifting 
contributing workers to early retirement pensioners and in marketing PW pensions.  
How do workers learn they are eligible?: marketing by insurance companies 
In contrast, insurance companies eagerly seized the opportunity to sell early 
retirement annuities to potential clients and lure them away from the AFP’s where they 
were contributing affiliates.  Eligibility was complicated to determine, but insurance 
salesmen figured this out and promptly informed qualifying workers. According to 
anecdotal evidence, brokers made loans to workers to put into their personal accounts, 
thereby enabling them to meet the eligibility criteria faster. Insurance companies handled 
the paperwork, bought the bono early and followed procedures to maximize the size of 
the allowable lump sum withdrawal. Of course, when they sold early retirement, they also 
sold annuities. It is widely believed that sales commissions were shared with new 
annuitants as unofficial rebates. To the degree that this happened, total payouts and the 
money’s worth ratios are higher than the official numbers suggest.
23  
Marketing costs are sometimes disparaged as a pay-off to aggressive salespersons 
in a zero or negative-sum game. However, in this case marketing provided useful 
information about the early retirement regulations set by government and pushed retirees 
in the direction of annuitization, which minimizes risk for government. Although the 
Chilean life insurance industry barely existed in 1981, it now takes in premiums of more 
than US$1 billion annually and holds reserves exceeding $10 billion. It is practically the 
only example of a large life insurance industry with annuities as its major product. 
Lower MPG for early retirees 
Early retirees are not eligible for the MPG until they reach the normal retirement 
age. However, early retirement creates a much longer period of retirement during which 
the MPG will rise, thereby increasing the probability that the retiree will end up 
subsidized. To counter this potential cost to the public treasury, the MPG applicable to  
early retirees is reduced. At the point of early retirement an actuarial factor is computed 
that depends on the retiree’s actual age and the interest rate and mortality rate table used 
in determining pension payouts. The annual pension equals the total accumulation 
divided by the actuarial factor.  At the same time, the actuarial factor is calculated as if 
the worker were at the normal retirement age, with the same interest rate and mortality 
table. This actuarial factor is about 13% higher for a male at 60 than at 65, thereby 
producing smaller payouts for early retirees. The MPG that may be paid some day is 
reduced by the proportional excess of the early factor over the later factor.
24 Part of the 
pension floor has been traded off to permit the option to retire early. This trade-off may 
deter early retirement for workers with small accumulations who expect to receive the 
MPG. It also adds the administrative and political complexity that a different MPG 
applies to each early retiree, depending on his or her age of retirement. It remains to be 
seen whether it is administratively feasible to keep track of this individual-specific MPG 
over long periods of time, and whether it is politically feasible for different people to 
have different pension floors, some of which may be quite low.  
Thus, an adjustment is made for the denominator in the pension payout 
equation—the increase in actuarial factor due to the younger age when the worker retires 
early.  But an adjustment is not made for the numerator—the decrease in size of account 
balance due to loss of interest and contributions that would have accrued if the money 
had stayed in the account for additional years.  With an interest rate of 5%, the 
accumulation would increase by 28% by age 65 even if no additional contributions are 
made, and if the worker continued to contribute the increase could be 40%. His annuity 
or PW payout at age 65 would then be 60% greater than that at age 60.  Even for workers 
who barely qualified for early retirement, this would largely eliminate the government’s 
contingent liability.  However, early withdrawals stop the pension growth, so the liability 
remains. This is discussed further in Part IV.  
Who retires early and who annuitizes? 
For workers who are eligible for early retirement, continued participation in the 
scheme becomes voluntary. If they choose retirement this indicates that the savings 
mandate was binding, at least at the margin.  Even if workers want to continue saving, it 
would be rational for them to choose to do so in a form where the investment and payout  
options are less constrained.  Therefore we would expect that most workers will retire as 
soon as they learn they are eligible and, given the high rates of return in the 1980’s and 
1990’s, we would expect high rates of early retirement. 
These eligibility conditions are much easier for high earners than low earners to 
meet and for high earners the MPG floor is not binding. The MPG is about 25% of the 
average male wage in the economy. Workers whose own-average wage is 27.5% of the 
economy-wide average need a 100% replacement rate of their own-wage in order to meet 
the MPG requirement. This is difficult to achieve. In contrast, an average-wage male 
worker with a 50% own-replacement rate gets 200% of the MPG and thereby 
automatically meets the MPG requirement (Figure 8).  We would therefore expect early 
retirees to have substantially higher pensions than normal retirees (who can retire at age 
65 regardless of replacement rate), with pensions well above the MPG, simply because of 
the eligibility conditions.  
In addition, we expect that insurance companies and brokers, whose fees are 
asset-based, will be more interested in facilitating early retirement for workers with large 
accumulations. Furthermore, workers with small accumulations have an incentive to 
postpone retirement to age 65 in order to qualify for the full MPG.
25  For all these reasons 
we would expect that, on average, pensions would be substantially higher for early than 
for normal retirees. 
We would also expect a higher proportion of early retirees to annuitize: They 
have larger accumulations, hence receive less insurance from the MPG and, additionally, 
face a reduced MPG; their longer period of retirement implies greater longevity and 
investment risk; and they were probably “sold” on early retirement by brokers and 
insurance companies who simultaneously sell them annuities.  
At the same time, workers with the largest accumulations are likely to take early 
retirement and they may choose PW because they have the greatest capacity to self-insure 
and may care more about bequests, as a luxury good. As a result of these forces, we 
would expect to find higher pension size over-all and, especially a higher PW pension 
size among early retirees as compared with normal retirees. 
In sum, regulations around the MPG combined with insurance company 
marketing references of pensioners lead us to predict that:  
1)  a high proportion of workers will retire early,  
2)  this will hold true especially for workers with large accumulations,   
3)  most early retirees will annuitize and 
4)  those who don’t annuitize will have relatively larger pensions among early 
retirees than among normal age retirees.  
This is exactly what we find.  
While only 6% of all retirees were early retirees in 1988, this percentage had risen 
to 47% in 1993 and 60% in 2002. Since the stock percentage was rising over much of this 
period, we can infer that the flow percentage was still higher. And 85% of these early 
retirees have annuitized.  Among annuitants, for whom we have individual-level data, 
85% of males and 58% of females retired early, 35% retired under the age of 55, and only 
5% retired after 65 (Table 11). Consistent with our expectations, the average size of 
pension is much larger for early retirees than for normal age retirees.  And PW payouts 
are especially larger for early than for normal retirees  (Table 7).  The fact that most early 
retirees annuitize reduces (but does not completely eliminate) the contingent risk to the 
public treasury. 
Does private information about expected longevity influence the annuity choice? 
Until now we have emphasized size of accumulation as a predictor of choice 
between annuitization and PW, in response to incentives and constraints set by 
regulations. This is different from the emphasis in the literature on how asymmetric 
information about state of health and expected longevity leads retirees to select 
themselves into or out of annuitization.  We have already seen that, for workers with 
small accumulations, PW dominates regardless of expected longevity. We have also seen 
that early retirees are more likely to annuitize than normal retirees, in part because they 
have larger accumulations. But all workers with large accumulations do not annutize. Do 
they have private information about health that influences their choice? We cannot 
investigate this question directly, since we do not have reliable information on mortality 
of PW pensioners. However, we do have information about mortality of annuitants, so we 
can investigate indirect evidence of private information. In Appendix B and Appendix 
Tables 1 and 2 we present this evidence, which indicates annuitants do have a modest 
amount of short run private information--their mortality probability shortly after  
annuitization is relatively low and those with relatively higher mortality in the short run 
are more likely to select annuities with a guaranteed payment period. Retirees with higher 
premiums have lower death rates and also are more likely to annuitize (but this 
information is not asymmetric). Thus some modest private information seems to exist, 
and annuitants seem to use it in a rational way. 
 
IV.  Public Liabilities  
 
Simulations of public liability for alternative scenarios 
The rules of the game for pension payouts, combined with marketing activities of 
insurance companies and brokers, have led workers with small accumulations to stay in 
the system until the normal retirement age and take PW, while those with larger 
accumulation withdraw from the system early, with annuities. This behavior, in turn, has 
implications for the government’s contingent liability. To investigate the implications of 
behavior and rules on public liabilities, we simulate the pension flow for representative 
male workers purchasing individual pensions under different assumptions concerning 
payout mode, retirement age, indexation provision for MPG and size of accumulation.  In 
each case we assume that the true mortality and interest rates are RV98 and r=5%, but the 
PW formula may use RV85 and r=6%. The results are presented in Tables 13A and B and 
14A and B. Our main findings: 
Price-indexed vs. wage-indexed MPG.  In all cases, a price-indexed MPG leads to 
a much later and smaller government liability than a wage-linked MPG. Of course, a 
price-indexed MPG also means that average pensions (in particular, pensions at the 
bottom end) fall through time relative to the average wage in the economy. A wage-
indexed MPG maintains the relative position of average pension and pension floor to 
average wage, but at a much higher cost to the government. For example, a worker who 
retires at age 65 with an annuity = 100% of MPG (4.46UF) receives a pension of 6.82UF 
at age 82 if the MPG is wage-linked but only 4.46 if it is price-indexed with no age 70 
jump-up. The higher pension is financed by the public treasury. Although formally the 
MPG is not indexed either to wages or prices, in practice the Chilean government has 
increased the MPG roughly on par with wages.  
Annuitization vs. PW.  The government’s contingent liability is much smaller 
under annuitization than under PW.  Indeed, if the MPG is price-indexed (and in the 
absence of an age-70 jump), the public liability disappears under annuitization. Under 
wage-indexation the public payment sometimes begins when the retiree is in his 70’s or 
early 80’s, but the amounts involved are always small—just enough to finance the top-up 
due to wage-indexation and age-70 jump, while the insurance company pays the main 
part of the pension. In contrast, the government takes over the full pension payment for 
most PW pensioners by their early 80’s. For example, a normal age retiree who purchases 
an annuity of 150% of MPG begins to get a 2% top-up at age 82, while if he chose PW he 
would deplete his account and be fully financed by the public treasury at age 81. This 
difference is due to the fact that mortality is pooled under annuitization so retirees who 
die before the expected age leave money in the pool to cover those who live longer, while 
PW pensioners who die young leave the money remaining in their accounts to their heirs, 
so the state must pick up the bill for those who live longer. The older the cohort and the 
longer its members live, the more individuals exhaust their accounts and the more it costs 
the government under PW compared with annuitization (Figure 9). 
Impact of overestimated mortality and interest rates for PW. The individual’s 
accumulation gets used up sooner and the government’s liability begins earlier and is 
larger if interest and mortality assumptions in the PW formula are unrealistically high.  
The pensioner gets more at first as a result of these assumptions, but the government pays 
more later. The government also specifies the assumptions for the PW formula. Our 
simulations indicate a 1-year’s difference in liability, in most cases, between RV98, r=5% 
and RV85, r=6%.  
Early vs. normal retirement.  Allowing workers to retire early also builds a   
contingent liability that could have been avoided if they had retired at the normal age. 
Holding the initial accumulation constant, early retirees run out of money 2-3 years 
sooner. Holding the pension constant—which implies a larger accumulation for early 
retirees--most of this incremental cost of early retirement disappears, due to the actuarial 
reduction in MPG that early retirees have accepted. However, the cost to the government 
would have been still less if workers were required to keep their money in the system 
until age 65. For example, a worker whose PW pension at 60 is 150% of the MPG, will  
use up his account by age 78, while if he kept his money in the system until age 65 the 
resulting larger accumulation would finance a pension that was 50% greater and would 
last until age 84.  From this perspective, it is fortunate that the rules of the game lead 
early retirees to annuitize, which counteracts—but does not completely eliminate—this 
opportunity cost.  
Small vs. large accumulations.  PW pensioners with small accumulations get the 
public benefit sooner. However, those with large accumulations also get it if they live 
long enough. For example, early retirees whose initial PW pension is more than 400% of 
the MPG (more than the average wage in the economy) end up fully financed by the 
government by age 87, an age that almost 30% will reach (Figure 9). In contrast, 
annuitants whose initial annuity exceeds 200% of the MPG will practically never qualify 
for the top-up.  From this vantage point, it is fortunate that workers with small 
accumulations are encouraged to stay in the system until normal retirement age, which 
reduces their need for subsidy; and that workers with large accumulations face incentives 
to annuitize, which reduces the perverse redistributions that they would  receive under 
PW.  
Other consequences of front-loaded private pensions and backloaded public benefit 
Level annuity payouts that begin early and PW payouts that decline collide with a 
pension floor that rises with wages, which means it rises as the cohort ages. This also 
means that the public benefit is back-loaded in the sense that the proportion of pensioners 
receiving a public benefit and the public/private share of total pension costs increase with 
the cohort’s age. At age 65 no one receives the public benefit, at 70 some annuitants get a 
small top-up, at 80 many PW pensioners have run out of their own funds and are fully 
financed by the government, and by their late 80’s the majority of pensioners (practically 
all PW recipients and many annuitants) who are still alive will receive some public 
benefit. This includes many whose accumulations were large enough to support a pension 
above the MPG level throughout their lifetimes—but who used up their money quickly 
through early retirement or through front-loaded PW pensions. 
This rising age profile of public benefits has several important implications:  
Pension convergence as cohorts age. Pension size will converge to the MGP level 
as a cohort ages. For most PW pensioners this happens in their 70’s, when the MPG  
constraint becomes binding on their withdrawals from their own accounts.  Small and 
medium-sized annuitants also converge by their early and mid-80’s, as the MPG rises 
above their constant annuity. The majority of pensioners who survive to their late 80’s 
will be receiving the same size total pension, which equals the MPG, and the public 
treasury will be paying a growing share of the total cost (Figure 10).   
Redistribution targets.  The MPG was originally intended to subsidize pensions of 
low earners who could not accumulate enough to purchase a minimal sized pension when 
they retired. In fact, the subsidy does begin sooner for those with small accumulations. 
But it eventually reaches those with larger accumulations, especially those on PW. The 
public benefit ends up going to those who are fortunate enough to live long as well as 
well as those who are unfortunate enough to have low lifetime earnings. Workers with 
larger accumulations are more likely to have above-average longevity and to collect the 
public benefit to a later age, which partially counteracts the original redistributional 
intent.  
Higher death rate lowers treasury’s costs.  The fact that public benefits are back-
loaded rather than uniform through the cohort’s age means that many retirees die before 
they become eligible for subsidy. For example, PW pensioners who initially purchased a 
pension that equaled 170% of the MPG are fully financed by the government by age 81, 
but only 55% of those who were alive at 65 live to 81--which reduces the expected 
burden they place on the treasury.   
Short run costs a poor predictor of long run costs in an immature system. 
Initially, in a new system, costs of the MPG will appear negligible, because retiring 
cohorts are “young old” and don’t yet qualify to receive the public benefit. But as the 
system matures and retired cohorts become “very old,” total costs will escalate. Since few 
workers retired under Chile’s new system before 1990, the oldest cohorts are now in their 
mid-70’s and unlikely to be collecting the public benefit yet, according to our 
simulations. Consistent with this, data from the SAFP show that only 12% of primary PW 
pensioners, 23% of widow PW pensioners and 1.5% of annuitants receive the MPG 
subsidy today. But another 66% of PW pensioners and 54% of PW widows are in the 
draw-down stage where the MPG floor has become binding (Table 8).  Our simulations 
tell us that this group will use up its savings within the next few years, after which their  
pensions will be financed by the public treasury.  More than half of all annuitants receive 
annuities that are less than 150% of the MPG and, according to our simulations, they will 
also move into the top-up stage as they pass age 80 over the next decade (Table 9).   
The rapid increase in number of very old cohorts that is about to take place in 
Chile will bring about a sharp and possibly unexpected acceleration in proportion 
receiving the public benefit. Unfortunately, data do not seem to exist in usable form on 
the flow of pensioners by age and pension size that would enable a more precise 
calculation of these forthcoming costs and other consequences.
26 Under stylized 
assumptions we estimate that the MPG would require (in general revenues) the equivalent 
of a 2.5-3% payroll tax in a mature system. Most of this is for PW pensioners and 
survivors.
27 The government may fail to recognize the contingent liability and other 
effects that it faces down the road, and may establish rules, early access options and 
guarantees that would not have been offered if these had been taken into account.  
It may be efficient to back-load public payouts and front-load private payouts, if 
the public sector has a comparative advantage in dealing with very long term risk. For 
example, the government may be better able than individuals to insure against 
unexpectedly large increases in longevity or prolonged decreases in investment earnings. 
But this becomes problematic if individuals have the power to make retirement choices 
that increase risk and shift it to the public treasury. A further danger is that the costs of 
bearing this risk will be non-transparent in the short term, during which excessive 
promises are made regarding public benefits. This underscores the importance of 
simulating the long-term flows from private pensions and public safety net, under 
different scenarios and designs, in order to enable informed choices about payout policies 
and trade-offs.  Such simulations have not been done in the past but they are likely to 
become increasingly important in the future. 
How to change the age profile of private and public payouts 
How can private behavior and public benefits be changed if change is desired? 
How can the age profile of private benefits and the socially acceptable pension floor be 
brought into closer alignment? Basically, this can be accomplished in two alternative 
ways--decreasing the upward trajectory of public benefits or reversing the early access to 
private accounts. The first policy could be accomplished by measures such as:   
•  switching to a price-indexed MPG or, less extreme, to Swiss indexation (half 
wages and half prices);  
•  wage-indexing the initial benefit for newly retiring cohorts but price-indexing for 
the stock of retirees;  
•  eliminating the age-70 jump;  
•  or by a more systematic enforcement of the means test.
28  
This would gradually reduce total old age income relative to worker’s income.  It would 
cut tax costs and moral hazard but would also imply greater investment and longevity risk 
to future cohorts and very old retirees.   
The second policy could be accomplished by a variety of means including:  
•  tightening access to early retirement (requiring a pension that equals 200% of the 
MPG would practically eliminate liability for early retirees, while keeping more 
accounts in the system, accumulating, until normal retirement age);
29  
•  imposing an escalation formula for PW designed to match the growth in MPG 
(this would reverse the front-loading of PW payouts by reducing the initial payout 
while increasing expected future payouts, and may increase the incentive to 
annuitize);
30  
•  requiring that PW pensions be supplemented by a deferred annuity that starts, for 
example, at age 78 (this is especially important for early retirees);
31 
•  using up-dated cohortized mortality tables and more realistic assumptions about 
future interest rates in the PW formula;   
•  requiring that annuities contain a floor that matches the expected growth in MPG 
(e.g. the floor might be set at current MPG + 1% or 2% annual growth);
32 
•  requiring that workers who do not have enough money to purchase an annuity at 
the current MPG level must annuitize in a special annuity pool, instead of taking 
PW; (this would eliminate the leakage to bequests that occurs now when such 
retirees take PW and die young).
33 
All these measures would cut tax costs and moral hazard, but would maintain the 
current relative position of pension floor and wage income. They would cover this floor 
by shifting the individual’s private retirement income from early to later years. 
Individuals would no longer have the option of consuming above the MPG level in their  
early retirement years while expecting government to pay once their pension falls below 
the MPG in their later years. The ability to retire early and the incentives for PW would 
be reduced. The treasury’s contribution toward the MPG would then be reserved, to a 
much greater extent, for those whose earnings and contributions were insufficient to 
finance a lifetime pension above the minimum.  
 
V. Lessons for the US and Other Countries 
 
We started out by asking: why do so many workers retire early and why do most 
early retirees annuitize while most normal age retirees take programmed withdrawals 
(PW)? We have presented evidence suggesting that guarantees plus incentives and 
constraints imposed by regulations are the major explanation for these observations. This 
is encouraging because pensioners and pension providers both seem to respond in 
predictable ways. When policies change, altering incentives, we can also expect behavior 
to change.   
Workers with small accumulations are required to postpone access and retire at 
the normal age. They choose (or are required to take) PW to maximize their expected 
lifetime retirement incomes, while protected against downside risk by the MPG.  Workers 
with large accumulations are permitted to retire early and do so—most retire well before 
the normal age. And since those with large pensions don’t get much relevant protection 
from the MPG, they choose to insure through annuitization.  Risk-aversion plays an 
important role for both groups, but they insure in different ways.   
Insurance companies, which base their implicit fee on the spread between the 
risk-fee rate they pay annuitants and the higher rate they earn on a diversified portfolio, 
profit from selling annuities to retirees with large premiums and pay commissions to 
brokers who pursue them as customers. In contrast, AFP’s, which provide PW pensions, 
are at a competitive disadvantage because they are not permitted to pay commissions to 
independent brokers and must make all their fees explicit. Moreover, AFP’s are less 
interested in competing for these clients--possibly because they fear that charging high 
explicit fees would create a political backlash that would hurt their profitable business 
during the accumulation stage.  The more aggressive selling by insurance companies  
reinforces the demand for insurance among early retirees described above.  It is ironical 
that marketing—the subject of much criticism during the accumulation stage--seems to 
play a socially useful role—encouraging annuitization—during the payout stage.
34 Two 
thirds of all retirees have annuitized and annuitization mitigates some of the risks of early 
retirement faced by pensioners and public treasury.  
The good news for other countries is that:  
•  detailed policies can strongly influence the probability of early versus postponed 
access and in Chile have gone far toward ensuring lifelong security for workers 
and their spouses; 
•  these policies include ruling out lump sum distributions at retirement or any 
distributions prior to retirement, requiring price-indexed and joint pensions, 
limiting early retirement but permitting work without contributions after a 
specified accumulation level has been reached; and 
•  with appropriate incentives, a high proportion of pensioners will purchase 
annuities that provide longevity insurance and reduce fiscal liabilities.  
But important caveats also emerge:  
•  in Chile these incentives include aggressive marketing by insurance companies 
and regulations that give these companies a competitive edge;  
•  if early withdrawal is permitted, many workers will choose that option, so early 
withdrawal conditions must be chosen with great care; and 
•  if these payout conditions are not well coordinated with safety net provisions, this 
may lead to moral hazard problems and unexpected public liabilities in the future.   
Appendix A—Sources of aggregate time series data on annuities and PW 
 We used three aggregate data sets: 
1) the Monthly Bulletin of SVS, which is based on monthly reports submitted to 
SVS by each insurance company. This is the most accurate source on annuity flows from 
1991-2002 and includes information about number and average size of policies and the 
interest rate at which they were sold in that month. It does not provide data on PW or data 
on stocks of pensioners or any data prior to 1991. 
2) the quarterly report provided by insurance companies to SVS (Fecu). This 
provides both flow data (number of policies sold in the quarter) and stock data (number 
of outstanding policies = all policies sold minus deaths) at the end of that quarter, 1985-
2002. However, in recent years many insurance companies have stopped supplying Fecu 
with data on number of new policies sold, so the Fecu flow data are not reliable or 
consistent with the Monthly Bulletin after 1999. Fecu provides the most reliable stock 
data on annuities, but it does not provide any data on PW or break down annuities into 
normal retirement versus early retirement. The Fecu stock aggregates for normal + early 
retirement are consistent with the sum of flows from the Monthly Bulletin after 1991.  
3) the annual report from SAFP, based on quarterly information from insurance 
companies on annuities and from AFP’s on PW pensions, 1982-2002. This provides stock 
information on total number of pensions sold and their average size but it does not 
subtract deaths. Therefore it may overestimate the number of outstanding policies; but 
underreporting by companies may lead it to understate outstanding policies (see below). 
SAFP has the advantage that it is the most complete data set--it includes both annuities 
and PW (separately), from the inception of the system, and the numbers are broken down 
between normal old age and early retirement.  For these reasons, we use these data to 
construct our tables on aggregate size of system by type of pension (Tables 2, 3 and 7).  
 However, we note that SVS reports 30-40% more annuities outstanding than 
SAFP. Insurance companies probably report more accurately to their own regulator, SVS. 
Since we have no other data source on PW, we don’t know whether this is also 
understated by SAFP. If PW is reported accurately, this means our tables understate the 
proportion of annuitization by about 3 percentage points for early retirement and 6 
percentage points for normal retirement.   
Appendix B.  Does private information about health influence annuitization?  
 
One of the key questions in the annuity literature is whether retiring workers 
possess private information about their state of health and expected longevity, that leads 
them to select themselves into or out of annuitization.  We have already seen that, for 
workers with small accumulations, PW is preferable regardless of expected longevity. 
But what about workers with large accumulations—do they have private information that 
influences their choice? We cannot investigate this question directly, since we do not 
have reliable information on mortality of PW pensioners. However, we do have 
information about mortality of annuitants, so we can investigate indirect evidence of 
private information.  
First, we hypothesize that, if private information exists, it is most likely to hold 
for the short run, rather than the long run. That is, individuals know more about their 
current state of health than their health in the distant future, and are unlikely to annuitize 
if they are currently ill. Therefore, we predict that 1) if private information exists, 
annuitants will have relatively low mortality in the first two or three years of retirement, 
but mortality rates eventually rise again (everyone eventually dies); we investigate how 
long this reduced mortality effect lasts.  
Second, we hypothesize that private information may influence the type of 
annuity product purchased. Annuitants who think they may have short lifespans are more 
likely to purchase joint annuities or annuities whose payments are guaranteed for a 
specified period. While all married men must purchase joint annuities in Chile, the 
possibility of guaranteed periods is left open to individual discretion. Therefore we 
predict that 2) if private information exists, annuitants who acquire annuities with 
guarantees are likely to have higher mortality than those who purchase annuities without 
guarantees. Again, if private information holds mainly for the short run, this effect should 
be especially pronounced in the first two or three years of the annuity contract. 
Finally, we investigate the relationship between size of premium and mortality 
among annuitants. Size of premium is likely to be positively correlated with the 
annuitant’s lifetime income, since premiums are a function of wages. (But note that some 
workers with small accumulations have part of their pension rights in the old system  
during this transition phase, so may be quite wealthy en toto).  Lifetime income, in turn, 
has been found to be negatively correlated with mortality rates in other countries. 
Therefore we predict that 3) higher premiums will imply lower death rates among 
annuitants, and this is one factor that may lead pensioners with large accumulations to 
annuitize. 
In this analysis we use the ratio of actual to expected deaths (A/E) of various 
groups. We observe actual deaths and use two standards—RV85 and RV98--to calculate 
expected deaths.  This allows us to control for the differential age composition of various 
groups. In our discussion we concentrate on the age-specific death rates given in RV98, 
but we include some results for RV85, which is the regulator’s standard. RV85 produces 
higher expected deaths and lower A/E ratios over-all, but relative positions of different 
groups is largely the same as for RV98. The A/E ratio for the entire population of male 
annuitants, 1990-2001, is 118% using RV98, 91% using RV85. The A/E for years 0+1 is 
102% for RV98, 77% for RV85. Thus, A/E for the first two years of exposure is only 84-
86% of the A/E for total years of exposure of the annuitant population, consistent with 
our expectation that private information leads to relatively low death rates of annuitants 
in the short run.  
However, the first two years of exposure contain a disproportionate number of 
workers who retired in 2000 and 2001 and belong to young cohorts, while the entire 
annuitant population contains many workers who retired in earlier years and belong to 
older cohorts. If mortality has been falling over time, we could be mistaking a cohort 
effect for a years-of-exposure effect. To distinguish these two effects, we display the 
whole array of A/E by year of retirement and years of exposure, and compare the A/E for 
the first two years of exposure with (a) the A/E for total years of exposure, and (2) the 
A/E for 5 years of exposure, separately for each year of retirement (Appendix Table 1). 
This clearly shows the declining mortality rate through time, especially during the latter 
1990’s, holding years of exposure constant, and the increasing A/E as years of exposure 
increase, holding year of retirement constant. A/E is especially low during the first two-
three years of exposure; it rises thereafter and then seems to stabilize around year 5. The 
ratio of A/E’s for years 0+1 to year 5 or beyond is around .85-.9 for most retirement 
cohorts, both for RV98 and RV85. This is consistent with our prediction that some  
modest amount of private information exists, it is concentrated in the short run, and 
unfavorable short run information is one factor that may have kept some people out of the 
annuity market.  
 We next proceed to compare the death rates for annuitants who chose products 
with and without guaranteed periods (Appendix Table 2). As expected, we find that A/E 
is less for those who purchased simple annuities, the effect is modest, and it too is 
concentrated in the first 2-3 years of exposure.   
Finally, we compare the death rates by size of premiums. Our hypothesis is that 
A/E will be lower the higher the premium (Appendix Table 2). In this case we have no a 
priori reason to expect the differential to decrease with years of exposure.  The effect 
turns out to be large and uniform across years of exposure. A/E decreases as premium 
size increases. A/E increases with years of exposure, but at the same rate for each 
premium size. Annuitants with premiums > 3000UF have an A/E ratio that is only two-
thirds that of annuitants with premiums < 1000UF for all years of exposure. If workers 
had  private information anticipating these mortality rates, we would expect that those 
with large accumulations would be more likely to annuitize, even without the incentives 
posed by the MPG, due to their greater longevity.  
However, insurance companies have full access to information about total size of 
premium, since Chilean workers are required to make their entire annuity purchase from 
one company.
 Insurance companies are also well aware of the wealth-longevity 
correlation, perhaps even more so than individuals. Thus, the information is not 
asymmetrical. Then we would expect them to put retirees with large accumulations into a 
higher risk category with lower payout per dollar of premium, and this risk differentiation 
would eliminate adverse self-selection based on the wealth-longevity correlation. In fact, 
however, we observe the opposite—annuity purchasers with large premiums get slightly 
higher MWR’s. This may be due to the fact that administrative costs of annuities are 
largely fixed (or even inversely related to size of premium, when the pension is in the 
neighborhood of the MPG). The higher administrative cost per dollar apparently 
outweighs the greater mortality of annuitants with small premiums, so on balance they 
get slightly inferior terms. The incentive for retirees with large accumulations to self-
select themselves into annuities then remains, as a result of their cost advantage.
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Appendix Table 1: A/E ratios by year of retirement and year of exposure, males, 
1990-2001 (expected mortality based on RV98, except for last row) 
 
  Years of exposure 
Actual/expected death ratios 
Year of  
retirement 0 
 
1  2 5 8 11 
Yrs(0+1/total 
for cal. yr* 
Yrs(0+1)/yr5 
for cal. yr* 
1990 84% 
 
107% 106% 121% 130% 126% 0.8.  0.84 
1991 124%
 
116% 133% 137% 126%     0.95  0.86 
1992 105%
 
111% 114% 120% 124%     0.87  0.91 
1993 89% 
 
116% 121% 119% 120%     0.91  0.92 
1994 93% 
 
117% 124% 124%       0.88  0.89 
1995 89% 
 
110% 113% 123%       0.87  0.85 
1996 94% 
 





101% 101%         0.93   
1998 98% 
 
104% 99%         1.05   
1999 83% 
 
94% 96%          0.96   
2000 87% 
 
96%         0.97   
2001 66% 
 
               1.00   
Total-RV98 90% 
 
106% 110% 122% 124% 126%
                         
0.86                     0.88   
Total-RV85 68% 
 
80%  83% 93% 96% 101%
                    
0.84 0.87 
* A/E ratios compare A/E for years 0+1 with A/E for year 5 and for total A/E, for each 
calendar year of retirement. “Total years of exposure” varies by calendar year. Year 5 
holds years of exposure constant at 5; this calculation is carried out only for the 
experience of retirement years 1990-96, which have 5 or more years of exposure.  
   
Appendix Table 2: A/E ratios by type annuity and size of premium, males, 1990-




  Years of exposure   
  1 2  3 5  7  9 10  # policies 
By type annuity 
Simple  70%  86%  93%  101%  104%  106% 108%          55,325 
Guaranteed  93%  102%  104% 106%  109%  110% 111%        118,765 
A/E(simple/guarant’d) 0.75  0.84  0.9  0.95  0.95  0.96  0.97       174,090
By premium size (CH UF) 
<1000  98%  105%  109%  113%  115%  117% 118%          71,978 
1000 - 3000  77%  97%  99%  103%  106%  107% 108%          80,104 
>3000  64%  59%  65%  72%  75%  78%  79%          22,008 




MPG growth in nominal and real terms, versus real wage growth, 1981-2002* 
 
For pensioners < age70  For pensioners > age 70  Date MPG 















May  81  3.7  3.17 2.84  3.7  3.17 2.84  111 
Oct.  82  4.2  3.25 2.73  4.2  3.25 2.73  105 
May  83  4.9  3.20 2.71  5.5  3.56 3.02  103 
Jan.  84  5.7  3.12 2.81  6.0  3.29 2.96  106 
Nov. 84  6.8  3.37  2.81  7.2  3.55  2.96    97 
May 85  7.0  2.87  2.48  7.4  3.03  2.62    99 
Jan. 86  8.0  2.84  2.60  8.4  2.99  2.74    99 
July  86  8.7  2.83 2.47  9.2  2.98 2.60  100 
May 87  10.1  2.87  2.46  10.8  3.07  2.63    99 
April 88  11.7  2.85  2.62  12.5  3.05   2.80  104 
Jan.  89  12.8  2.86 2.69  13.7  3.06 2.88    107 
June  89  13.5  2.83 2.60  14.4  3.02 2.78  109 
Nov.  89  15.8  3.04 2.61  16.8  3.25 2.79    107 
July  90  20.9  3.46 2.95  22.0  3.64 3.10  112 
Feb.  91  24.0  3.39 3.01  25.3  3.57 3.17  118 
Nov.  91  27.8  3.48 2.99  29.3  3.67   3.15  115 
Dec.  92  32.0  3.44 3.03  33.7  3.62 3.20  123 
Dec.  93  35.8  3.40 3.12  37.7  3.58 3.29  131 
Dec. 94  39.0  3.40  3.23  41.1       3.58   3.40  138 
Sept 95  42.9  3.55  3.45  45.2       3.74  3.63  140 
Dec. 95  46.4  3.73  3.51  48.9       3.93   3.79  145 
Dec. 96  49.5  3.74  3.52  54.7       4.14  3.90  149 
Dec. 97  55.0  3.92  3.76  60.9       4.34   4.16  151 
Dec. 98  57.4  3.92  3.91  65.5       4.34  4.32  155 
Jan. 99  65.4  4.45  4.35  71.5       4.87   4.76  156 
Dec. 99  67.1  4.46  4.27  73.3       4.88  4.67  159 
Dec. 00  70.2   4.47   4.32  76.8       4.89   4.72  160 
Dec. 01  72.4  4.45  4.33  79.1       4.87  4.73  164 
Dec. 02  74.5   4.46     81.5       4.87     166 
Dec.02/May81    141%        154%    150% 
Source: MPG from Primamerica, wage index from Instiuto Nacional de Estadisticas . 
* The MPG is specified in nominal pesos. It is changed on an ad hoc basis periodically. 
All changes are shown. The MPG for pensioners over age 70 is about 9% higher than the 
MPG for pensioners under  age 70.  Columns for UF show conversion into price-indexed 
Chilean currency, UF’s. UF value is higher at beginning of each period, then declines as 
price level rises until MPG is revalued. For this reason we show UF value at beginning 
and end of each period. 1 UF has a constant purchasing power through time. Conversion 
from UF to US$ has varied from $20.84 = 1 UF in Dec. 1983 to $23.44 = 1 UF in 2002.  
 
Table 2: Percentage of policies that are annuitized--stock 
  By # policies  By total payouts 












1983  .2%   .2%  .3%    .3% 
1984  .5%   .5%  1%    1% 
1985  1%   1%  15%   15% 
1986  17%   17%  34%    34% 
1987  27%   27%  50%    50% 
1988  29% 99%  33%  51%  99%  57% 
1989  27% 99%  38%  45%  97%  56% 
1990  29% 99%  43%  49%  97%  64% 
1991  28% 94%  51%  42%  87%  63% 
1992  27% 90%  53%  37%  78%  60% 
1993  27% 88%  55%  37%  77%  61% 
1994  26% 82%  54%  34%  66%  55% 
1995  25% 77%  54%  33%  61%  52% 
1996  27% 79%  57%  37%  65%  56% 
1997  29% 80%  59%  39%  66%  57% 
1998  31% 85%  63%  44%  77%  67% 
1999  34% 84%  64%  46%  76%  66% 
2000  33% 85%  63%  44%  73%  64% 
2001  33% 85%  64%  45%  75%  66% 
    2002  34% 85%  64%  46%  77%  68% 
Source: calculated by authors from Primamerica data (obtained from SAFP). 
  
 Table 3: Percentage of total retirement policies that are early retirement, 1983-2002 
 
  By # of policies  By payout amounts 




(CH UF 000) 
% early 
retirement 
1983  0.4  0  1.2  0 
1984  1.7  0  5.6  0 
1985  2.7  0  8.2  0 
1986  4.8  0  17.5  0 
1987  8.0  0  30.4  0 
1988  12.6  6%  58.2  13% 
1989  19.7  14%  105.3  22% 
1990  29.7  20%  166.1  30% 
1991  45.5  34%  312.8  47% 
1992  62.1  42%  459.7  55% 
1993  80.0  47%  606.2  60% 
1994  104.2  51%  857.0  64% 
1995  125.7  56%  1039.7  67% 
1996  142.2  57%  1182.4  69% 
1997  160.7  58%  1356.3  69% 
1998  177.4  60%  1405.8  70% 
1999  199.0  59%  1665.8  69% 
2000  227.0  59%  1972.7  69% 
2001  252.6  59%  2235.7  69% 
       2002* 261.7  60%  2306.2  69% 
Source: calculated by authors from Primamerica data (obtained from SAFP). 
*includes policies issued as of June 2002.  
1 UF has a constant purchasing power through time. Conversion from UF to US$ has 
varied from $20.84 = 1 UF in December 1983 to $23.44 = 1 UF in 2002. Therefore, 
retirement payouts in 2002 totalled US$67.7 million.  
   
Table 4: Actual/expected deaths among annuitants, RV85 vs. RV98, 1990-2001 
 
Mortality tables (period)  Men-normal old age  Women-normal old age 
  1990-2001        1997-2001*  1990-2001        1997-2001* 
RV85  87%                     75%  70%                       64%          
RV98  105%                   93%            90%                       85%          
 Men-early  retirement  Women-early retirement 
RV85  93%                     76%  73%                        61% 
RV98  123%                  103%  99%                        83% 
Source: Calculations by actuary Jorge Lillo and authors based on individual-level data on 
all annuitants supplied by SVS  
Signifies cohorts retiring 1997-2001. 
  
Table 5: Money’s Worth Ratios, Chile  
A. March, 2003 payouts and term structure for premium = 1,000UF, using risk-free 
rate; comparing impact of different mortality tables and annuity products 












Age 65, SPIA  7.08 98.1 101.2  93.5 
Age 55, SPIA  5.46 94.1 97.6 90.1 
Joint, male 65 & female 
60, 60% to survivor 
5.89 97.7 100.8  94.6 
Joint, male & female 55, 
60% to survivor 
4.82 91.6 94.6 89.1 
Females 
Age 60, SPIA  5.37 92.5 95.8 89.7 
Age 55, SPIA  4.81 89.9 92.9 87.4 
 
B. MWR compared under different discount rates, size premiums and time periods, 
using RV98 cohortized mortality tables 
Product   1,000  UF 
premium, 












free rates  
Males 
Age 65, SPIA  90.5 101.3  8.20  100.8 
Age 55, SPIA  87.9 99.9 -  - 
Joint, male 65 & female 
60, 60% to survivor 
88.3 102.5  7.31*  102.9* 
Joint, male & female 55, 
60% to survivor 
82.1 98.9 -  - 
Females 
Age 60, SPIA  84.5 99.2 7.23*  99.3* 
Age 55, SPIA  81.0 97.7 -  - 
Source: Calculations by authors. For further details see text. 
*Notes: Annuity quotes were obtained on March 31, 2003 from 4 companies and average 
payouts were used. We obtained quotes for two sizes of premiums—100,000 and 
400,000. Similar procedure was used in March 1999 in Panel B (see James, Song and 
Vittas 2001).  
Term structure of risk-free rates for March 2003 was based on zero coupon bonds issued 
by the Central Bank. As these are thinly traded, we used transactions that took place on 
different days of March 2003, not only March 31. Risk-free term structure for March 
1999 was extracted from PRC bonds of different durations, as 0 coupon bonds were not 
in use at that time. We defined risky rate = risk-free rate+1.4%, which is approximately 
the rate of return on invesemtnes by insurance companies. 
All mortality tables used in Chile are period tables. We “cohortized” the 1998 period 
table by imputing the improvement factor used by Canadian Society of Actuaries.  
 
 
Table 6: Rate of return on PW, annuities, insurance company and AFP investments, 























1993  5.16 7.48  6.81  16.7 6.7  1.5  2.33 
1994  4.76 9.63  5.88  17.8 7.1  2.3  4.88 
1995  4.83 6.13  6.11  -2.5 7.4  2.6  1.30 
1996  5.09 4.84  6.11  3.3  6.4  1.3  -0.26 
1997  5.01 5.88  6.31  4.8  6.3  1.3  0.87 
1998  5.57 4.74  7.18  -1.6 6.1  .5  -0.83 
1999  5.31 8.25  6.45  16.6 6.3  1.0  2.94 
2000  5.37 5.76  6.4  4.6  6.4  1.0  0.39 
2001  5.26 6.89  5.52  7.2  6.2  .9  1.63 
2002*  5.25 6.56  4.84  2.5  5.6  .3  1.31 
Av.  5.16 6.62  6.16  7.0  6.5  1.3  1.46 
 
Source: Primamerica data base 
Notes: 20 yr AFP average real returns, 1981-2001 = 10.7%;  
2003 annuity rate was 5.2% and PW rate was 5.6% 
Investment returns includes realized capital gains but not unrealized capital gains. 
Table 7: Average monthly payout per pensioner from annuities and programmed 
withdrawals, in Chile, 1983-2002 (in Chilean UFs)* 
 
  Normal old age  Early retirement 












PW-    
stock 
1983   3.7  2.9    -.66     
1984   8.5  3.2    -.09     
1985   8.4  2.8    -.23     
1986   7.3  2.9    -.09     
1987   7.0  2.6    -.47     
1988   7.7  3.0    -.05   9.4  12.9 
1989    7.9  3.7    .64    8.2  20.5 
1990   8.2  3.4    -.24   8.4  17.9 
1991    8.3  4.3    .83    8.6  15.8 
1992    8.0  4.6    .78    8.4  15.6 
1993              8.1  7.7  4.5    .92              8.6  8.4  13.5 
1994              7.7  7.8  5.0  1.42              8.3  8.3  14.8 
1995              7.3  7.9  5.2  1.46              7.9  8.1  14.5 
1996              9.3  8.3  4.9    .76              9.2  8.2  13.3 
1997              9.1  8.3  5.0    .66              9.2  8.2  13.6 
1998            10.9  8.6  4.6  1.26            10.9  8.4  10.7 
1999            11.6  8.7  4.9    .03            11.4  8.7  11.3 
2000           11.0  8.8  5.2    .31            10.9  8.9  14.1 
2001            12.4  9.1  5.2    .33            10.8  9.1  13.7 
2002*            12.4  9.3  5.2    .33            11.6  9.3  12.4 
Source: Calculated by authors from SVS data for flows and SAFP data for stocks.  
*UF is the price-indexed Chilean currency. 1 UF has a constant purchasing power 
through time. Conversion from UF to US$ has varied from US$20.84 = 1 UF in 1983 to 
US$23.44 = 1U in 2002. Therefore, average monthly payout for new annuities in 2002 
was US$291.  
 
Table 8: Actual PW payouts compared with MPG, May 31, 2003 (in 000) 
 



































old age  9.1  4.72  49.0 4.38  15.0 7.26  0.8  6.74  73.9 5.04 
79% 
Early 
retirement  0  0 3.2 4.38  13.0  14.85  1.2 14.38  13.8  12.9 
18% 
widows  7.6  4.18  18.3 3.48  6.7  6.16  0.8  7.86  33.4 4.29  77% 
orphans  4.3  0.66  13.5 0.68  8.5  2.93  1.4  2.7 27.7 1.47  64% 
Source: data provided by SAFP and calculations by authors 
This table shows number of pensioners and their survivors who already receive the full 
MPG from the government (col. 1); those who are still drawing down their own 
accumulations but at an accelerated rate in order to stay above the MPG floor (col. 2); 
those who are following the PW formula above the MPG level (col. 3); and those who 
have voluntary reduced their payouts, perhaps for tax reasons, while remaining above the 
MPG (col. 4). % whose current pensions are at MPG level is given in final column. This 
table applies only to PW pensioners. 
  












< 4           4,102          12,418         1,839         2,063  20422 
4 - 4.5           3,363          14,722         1,497         2,569  22151 
4.5 - 5           3,041          14,674         1,576         2,450  21741 
Sum of <5        10,506          41,814         4,912         7,082  64314 
5 - 7.5           6,969          39,544         4,476         6,966  57955 
7.5 - 10           2,906          19,051         2,505         3,699  28161 
10 - 15           2,589          20,661         3,070         3,589  29909 
15 & more            4,559          25,491         2,644         2,975  35669 










<  4  15% 8%  10% 8%  9% 
4  -  4.5  12% 10% 9%  11% 10% 
4.5  -  5  11% 10% 9%  10% 10% 
Sum  of  <5  38% 29% 28% 29% 30% 
5  -  7.5  25% 27% 25% 29% 27% 
7.5  -  10  11% 13% 14% 15% 13% 
10  -  15  9%  14% 17% 15% 14% 
15  &  more    17% 17% 15% 12% 17% 
Total  100% 100% 100% 100% 1 
 
Source: calculated by authors from data on all annuitants provided by SVS 
Note: Current MPG=4.46UF, or 4.87UF for pensioners > age70. This table does not 
include PW pensioners.   
Table 10: Number of old age annuitants who receive MPG top-up  


















 Source: SAFP  
Table 11: Age at which current stock of annuitants retired from the system* 
 
  Men Women 
  # (000)  %  # (000)  % 
<50         15.4  9%  4.2                    10% 
50<55          46.0   26%                    10.1                    24% 
55<60          53.3  31%                      9.9                     24% 
60            9.0  5%                    10.1                     24% 
>60<65           22.9  13%                      5.7                     14% 
65          18.2  10%                       .5                      1% 
>65<70                7.3  4%                      1.1                      3% 
70+           2.1  1%                        .4                       1% 
Total  174.1  100%                    41.9                   100% 
% early retirem’t                   85%                      58% 
% 60 or below                   71%                      82% 
% above age 65                     5%                        4% 
Source: calculated by Jorge Lillo from SVS data 
* This does not mean that they retire from the labor force; only that they stop contributing 
and start withdrawing.  
Table 12A: Simulations: Annuity payouts compared with PW payouts under 
different scenarios, normal retirement at age 65  
(RV98 is assumed to give actual mortality rates and real interest rate earned = 5%). 
Accumulation 
at 65 (CH 
UF) 
Annuity at  65 














No MPG, payouts based on RV98, r=5% 
597 4.46 
(100%MPG) 
4.46   =>0  never 66  on 
Price-indexed MPG, payouts based on RV98, r=5% 
597 4.46 
(100%MPG) 
4.46   4.46  never  never 
Price-indexed MPG, PW payouts based on RV85, r=6% 
597 4.46 
(100%MPG) 
5.05    4.46  65-68  never 
895 6.69 
(150%MPG) 
7.57   4.87  65-68  69 on 
1193 8.92 
(200%MPG) 
10.0F   4.87  65-68  69 on 
Wage-linked MPG, PW payouts based on RV85, r=6% 
597UF 4.46 
(100%MPG) 
5.05    4.73  65-68  never 
895UF 6.69 
(150%MPG) 
7.57   5.71  65-68  69-81 
1193UF 8.92 
(200%MPG) 
10.09   6.18  65-68  69-95 
 
Source: calculations by authors 
 
* Annuity is constant except that under wage-linked MPG annuity is topped up to rising 
MPG beginning at ages 66, 82 and 96, respectively, for different initial accumulations. 
We define wage-linked as a 2% annual growth rate in MPG. Public benefit jumps 9% at 
age 70 in either case.  
Table 12B: Simulations: Annuities payouts compared with PW payouts under 
different scenarios, early retirement at age 60  
(RV98 is assumed to give actual mortality rates and real interest rate earned = 5%). 
Accumula-
tion at 60 
(CH UF) 
Annuity payout 














Price-indexed, payouts based on RV98, r=5% 
742 4.91 
(110%MPG) 
4.91   4.24  never  61 on 
Price-indexed MPG, payouts based on RV85, r=6% 
742 4.91 
(110%MPG) 
5.6 4.24  60-66  67  on 
1013 6.69 
(150%MPG) 
7.64 4.24 60-66 67  on   
1350 8.92 
(200%MPG) 
10.19 4.24  60-66  67  on 
Wage-linked MPG, payouts based on RV85, r=6% 
742 4.91 
(110%MPG) 
5.6 4.94  60-75  never 
1013 6.69 
(150%MPG) 
7.64 5.94 60-65 66-83 
1350 8.92 
(200%MPG) 
10.19 6.18  60-65  66-97 
 
Source: calculations by authors 
 
* Annuity is constant except that under wage-linked MPG, annuity is topped up to rising 
MPG at ages 70, 84 and 98, respectively. We define wage-linked as a 2% annual growth 
rate in MPG. Public benefit jumps 9% at age 70 in either case.  
Table 13A: Simulations of private and public benefits for annuitants under normal 
retirement at age 65  (interest rate = 5%, mortality assumptions based on RV98)  
Accumula-
tion at age 
65 in CH UF 
Pension at 65   




















at age 82   
in CH UF 
(%MPG82)  
 Price-indexed MPG 
597  4.46   
(100% MPG) 
70  90%  (13)  8%  4.87 
(100%MPG) 
895 6.69   
(150% MPG) 
never 0  0  6.69 
(137%MPG) 
1193 8.92   
(200% MPG) 
never 0  0  8.92 
(183%MPG) 
Wage-linked MPG 
597 4.46   
(100% MPG) 
66  98%  (16)  35%  6.82 
(100%MPG) 
895 6.69   
(150% MPG) 
82  51%    (6)  2%  6.82 
(100%MPG) 
1193 8.92   
(200% MPG) 
96  5%      (2)  0  8.92 
(131%MPG) 
Source: simulations by authors 
This table shows how pension under annuity varies depending on whether price or wage 
indexation of MPG is assumed. In the past MPG has risen roughly on par with wages. We 
define “wage-indexation” as a projected growth in real MPG of 2% annually. MPG 
jumps 9% at age 70 in either case. Col. 1 shows accumulation when worker retires at age 
65 and col. 2 shows real annuity this purchases.  Three different accumulations are shown 
that finance annuities = 100%, 150% and 200% of MPG at age 65. Col. 3 shows age 
when MPG rises above fixed annuity (due to age 70 jump-up and wage indexation) so 
public top-up begins. Col. 4 shows probability at age 65 that pensioner will survive to age 
when he begins collecting MPG top-up (and number of years he expects to live after that 
point, contingent on surviving to that point). Col. 5 shows percentage of total pension 
paid by government at age 82, which is the expected lifetime of male at age 65 under 
RV98. Col. 6 shows total pension at age 82 (when wage-linked MPG=6.82UF) and total 




Table 13B: Simulations of private and public benefits for PW under normal 
retirement at age 65  




65  in   
CH UF 
PW/annuity 






















at age 82 
Total PW 
pension  at 
82/pension at 
65 in CH UF   
PW/ annuity 
at age 82 
(%MPG82) 
No MPG, PW formula based on RV98, r=5% 
597 4.46/4.46UF  NA  never  0  0  2.32/4.46  2.33/4.46UF 
Price-indexed MPG, PW formula based on RV98, r=5% 
597  100/100%   65  79  63%     (8)   100%  4.87/4.46    100/100% 
Price-indexed MPG, PW formula based on RV85, r=6% 
597  113/100%   69  78  67%     (8)  100%  4.87/5.05  100/100% 
895  170/150%   76  83  47%     (6)  0  4.87/7.57   100/137% 
1193  226/200%   80  86  34%     (5)  0  4.87/10.09   100/183% 
2386  456/400%  87  91  17%     (3)  0  7.94/20.19    163/366% 
Wage-linked MPG, PW formula based on RV85, r=6% 
597  113/100%   68  77  70%     (9)  100%  6.82/5.05  100/100% 
895  170/150%   73  81  55%     (7)  100  6.82/7.57  100/100% 
1193  226/200%   77  84  43%     (5)  0  6.82/10.09   100/131% 
2386  456/400%   84  88  27%     (4)  0  7.94/20.19   116/262 
Col. 1 shows accumulation when worker retires at age 65.  Four different accumulations 
are shown, that are large enough to finance annuities = 100%, 150%, 200% and 400% of 
initial MPG. Col. 2 shows initial PW/annuity payout as % of MPG at age 65. Col. 3 
shows age when MPG constraint becomes binding, although pension is still paid by 
drawing down individual’s account. Col 4shows age at which account balance=0 under 
PW, so public benefit begins. Col. 5 shows probability of survival at age 65 to the age at 
which public benefit begins. Number in parentheses gives expected years of future 
lifetime after that point, contingent on surviving to that point. Col.6 shows percentage of 
total pension paid by government at age 82, which is expected lifetime of male at age 65 
under RV98. Col. 7 shows total pension at age 82 (when wage-linked 
MPG=6.82UF)/initial pension. Col 8 shows PW/annuity payout as % of MPG at age 82. 
Calculations are for individual PW for single male. Price and wage indexation scenarios 
are given; in the past MPG has risen roughly on par with wages. We define “wage-
indexation” as a projected growth in real MPG of 2% annually. MPG jumps 9% at age 70 
in either case.   
Table 14A: Simulations of private and public benefits for annuitants under early 
retirement at 60  (interest rate = 5%, mortality assumptions based on RV98)  
Accumula-
tion at age 60 
(CH UF) 





















at 82 in CH UF 
(% full MPG82) 
Price-indexed MPG  
742  4.91   
(110% MPG) 




never 0  0  5.88 
(119% MPG) 
Wage-linked MPG  
742 4.91   
(110% MPG) 




76  69%    (9)  11%  6.55 
(87% MPG) 
1013  6.69   
(150% MPG) 
84  40%    (5)  0  6.69 
(89%  MPG) 
1350 8.92 
(200% MPG) 
98  3%      (2)  0  8.92  
(118%  MPG) 
Source: simulations by authors 
This table shows how pension under early retirement annuity varies depending on 
whether price or wage indexation of MPG is assumed. In the past MPG has risen roughly 
on par with wages. We define “wage-indexation” as a projected growth in real MPG of 
2% annually. MPG jumps 9% at age 70 in either case. Relevant MPG for early retirement 
at age 60 is 87% of full MPG. Col. 1 shows accumulation when worker retires at age 65 
and col. 2 shows real annuity this purchases.  Four different accumulations are shown that 
finance annuities = 110% (which is the minimum for early retirement), 130% (which will 
become the new minimum), 150% and 200% MPG. Col. 3 shows age when MPG rises 
above fixed annuity (due to age 70 jump-up and wage indexation) so public top-up 
bewgins. Col. 4 shows probability at age 60 that pensioner will survive to age when he 
begins collecting MPG top-up (and number of years he expects to live after that point, 
contingent on surviving to that point). Col. 5 shows percentage of total pension paid by 
government at age 82, which is expected lifetime of male at age 65 under RV98. Col. 6 
shows total pension at age 82 (when full wage-linked MPG = 6.82 and reduced MPG for 





Table 14B: Simulations of private and public benefits for PW under early 
retirement at age 60  






























age 82  
Total PW 
pension at 82/ 
pension  at 60 





No MPG, PW formula based on RV98, r=5% 
742 4.91/4.46UF  NA never  0  0  2.33/4.91 2.33/4.91 
Price-indexed MPG, PW formula based on RV98, r=5% 
742  110/110%  69  80  55%    (7)  100%  4.24/4.91   87/101% 
Price-indexed MPG, PW formula based on RV85, r=6% 
742  126/110%  69  79  59%    (8)  100%  4.24/5.6   87/101% 
878  148/130%  71  81  52%    (7)  100%  4.24/6.62   87/119% 
1013  171/150%  74  82  48%    (6)  100%  4.24/7.64   87/137% 
1350  228/200%  78  85  36%    (5)      0  4.87/10.19   100/183% 
2700  456/400%  82  87  29%    (4)      0  7.07/20.37  145/366% 
Wage-linked MPG, PW formula based on RV85, r=6% 
742  126/110%  66  76  69%    (9)  100%  6.55/5.6   87/87% 
878  148/130%  69  78  63%    (8)  100%  6.55/6/62   87/87% 
1013  171/150%  70  79  59%    (8)  100%  6.55/7.64   87/89% 
1350  228/200%  74  82  48%    (6)  100%  6.55/10.19   87/118% 
2700  456/400%  82  87  29%    (4)      0  7.07/20.37  94/237% 
Source: simulations by authors 
Columns and rows are same as Table 12B except that retirement age is 60, smallest 
accumulation yields annuity = 110% of MPG (minimum needed for early retirement) and 
MPG is reduced 13% because of early retirement adjustment (proportional to reduction in 
actuarial factor). Therefore benefit at age 82 is less than full MPG and less than normal 
age retiree gets. Early retirees draw down their accounts at the full MPG level until their 








































Real wage index 
Figure 2: Proportion of policies that are annuitized is much higher for early than for 











































































% early retirement 
Figure 4: Investment returns to insurance companies exceeds internal rate of return 







Note: Investment returns include realized capital gains and losses but do not include 
unrealized gains and losses. 




































Note: 597 UF purchases annuity = 100% MPG 
2386UF purchases annuity = 400% MPG






















































Note: Premium = 597 UF, enough to purchase annuity = 100% of MPG in year 1. 
Annuity follows MPG line thereafter. PW for no MPG is shown under same assumptions 
as annuity. PW with MPG is shown for higher expected mortality and interest rate 
yielding larger payout initially. In all cases MPG jumps up 9% at age 70. 













































PW-no MPG (RV98, r=5%)
annuity with p-indexed MPG
PW (RV85, exp r=6%) with p-indexed
MPG
annuity with w-linked MPG
PW (RV85, exp. r=6%) with w-linked
MPG 



















































annuity with p-indexed MPG
annuity with w-linked MPG
PW (RV85, exp. R=6%) with w-
linked MPG
PW (RV85, exp. R=6%) with p-
indexed MPG 
 





* For workers whose own-average wage<220% MPG (<55% economy-wide average 
wage), the binding constraint is 110% MPG. When this is satisfied, the own-wage 
requirement is over-satisfied.  For workers whose average wage>220% MPG, the 
binding constraint is 50% own-wage. When this is satisfied, the MPG requirement 
is over-satisfied. 







































Figure 9: Declining balance under PW, with wage-indexed MPG, for different 
accumulations (and implications for public/private shares) 
 
 
Note: Initial premium is large enough to purchase annuity = 100%, 150%, 200% and 
400% MPG, respectively. Private share of pension is 100% when account is positive. 
When account is exhausted private share is 0 and public share becomes 100%. 
















































Note: Initial premium is large enough to purchase annuity = 100%, 150%, 200% and 
400% MPG, respectively. Convergence of payouts occurs when account is still positive, 
when rising MPG line is reached.  
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Endnotes 
                                                 
1  This contrast with Singapore, for example, where withdrawals are permitted for 
housing. These withdrawals have led to a heavy investment in housing by workers and 
very low cash balances upon retirement. 
 
2 The choice of annuitization is irrevocable. In contrast, retirees who start with PW can 
choose to annuitize later on. It is also possible for retirees to take a temporary withdrawal 
(TW) for one to three years and purchase a deferred annuity that applies afterwards. In 
this case, the initial PW can be 1-2 times as great as the monthly future annuity will be. 
One might expect this to become very popular as it allows for large early payouts while 
also providing longevity insurance. However, the data do not allow us to distinguish 
between immediate annuitants and those who become annuitants after some years on 
temporal withdrawal or PW. Most available data are on stocks of pensioners, and these 
show a very small proportion of temporal withdrawals. This is to be expected, as retirees 
quickly move out of the temporal withdrawal category. Even if everyone started out in 
TW, only 10-15% of all retirees would still be in TW after 20 years of equal-sized 
cohorts. For purposes of this paper, we treat workers who choose temporal withdrawal as 
annuitants, which they become very soon. 
 
3  One advantage of a minimum pension is that it is relatively easy to implement 
administratively—simply by checking the individual’s own annuity or PW pension. The 
transactions costs are much lower than for means-testing based on more general income 
and assets. However, this also means that some individuals with small pensions but large 
non-pension wealth or income get a public subsidy—which many would regard as a poor 
use of public funds. Chile attempts to avoid this possibility by making eligibility for the 
MPG top-up contingent on the absence of other sources of income. But this reintroduces 
a means-test and the transactions costs it implies. Chile passes these enforcement costs on 
to the AFP’s and insurance companies. This makes retirees with low pensions expensive 
to such companies, and undesirable if these costs can’t be recouped. While required to 
enforce, these companies have little incentive to do so carefully. We are unable to assess 
how effectively the broader income test is implemented. 
 
4 The Inverlink scandal started with the discovery by the President of the Chilean Central 
Bank that confidential information in his personal computer was being sent by his 
secretary to a friend of hers who was an active participant in the capital market (partner 
and manager of a stock broker company, Inverlink). When this news was released to the 
market, clients of the Inverlink Group started to withdraw their money from Inverlink 
accounts. Inverlink faced a huge liquidity problem.  
To overcome the financial crisis, Inverlink asked for cash from its related financial 
institutions, the pension fund AFP Magíster, the life insurance company Le Mans 
Desarrollo and the health insurance organization Isapre Vida Plena. AFP Magíster 
refused to do have any  financial transaction with Inverlink, but Le Mans and Isapre Vida 
Plena agreed to transfer cash in exchange for financial instruments. Inverlink took this 
money but failed to deliver the financial papers. This meant that Le Mans Desarrollo lost 
Ch $10,000 million (approximately US $ 15 million).  
                                                                                                                                                 
Today, the group has been taken over by the supervising authorities, the insurance 
company has a negative equity (approximately the same Ch $ 10,000 million) and it will 
probably be declared bankrupt or liquidated. Le Mans has several outstanding annuity 
policies (3,082 annuity policies, 3,203 pensioners and CH $ 91,500 millions in technical 
reserves as of March 31, 2003) and also some other life insurance policies. It is likely that 
the Chilean Government guarantee for annuity pensioners of a bankrupt insurance 
company will be used for the first time. 
 
5 The 13% figure is based on a 10% net contribution + 3% for administrative expenses 
and disability and survivors insurance. The increase in liquidity of retirement savings and 
in monthly income flows may lead some workers to withdraw from the labor market. 
This would hold for workers who have been forced to save more than they would have 
chosen for their retirement, and who prefer to spend some of that saving on leisure 
instead of material consumption. But the elimination of the 13% payroll tax may have a 
positive effect on continued labor supply. The liquid wealth and the substitution effects 
therefore work in opposite directions in influencing the labor supply of older workers. In 
either case, workers can no longer increase the present value of their pension by 
withdrawing from the labor force, as they could in the old DB system. This reduces the 
incentive that existed in the old system to stop working early. This is the topic of a future 
inquiry that we plan to undertake.  
 
6  It is likely that early retirees have lower mortality rates than normal retirees, because 
they are younger, on average, and richer (hence may have lower age-specific mortality 
rates). If this is the case, the flow of new retirees into early versus normal retirement, 
would be closer to 50% of the total rather than 60%. However, we do not have flow data 
for PW pensioners, so cannot derive total flow ratios.  
 
7 Joint PW affords less certainty to the widow than joint annuities, as both the primary 
and secondary benefits are recalculated and fall every year. If her husband dies young she 
gets a joint pension that is higher than the annuity she would have gotten, but if he dies 
late in life, she gets a smaller pension. Since the wife of a long-lived husband is likely to 
be younger than he and must live on the smaller joint pension for several years, she (and 
eventually the public treasury) bears much of the longevity risk. 
 
8 Simulations show that the expected widow’s benefit exceeds both the own-pension of 
the average working woman and the MPG (James, Edwards and Wong 2003).  Chile also 
has a means-tested social assistance program for the elderly who are destitute. Widows 
who receive the joint annuity are less likely to qualify for social assistance.  The 
requirement that most wives purchase individual pensions also saves money for the 
government, since it yields a higher monthly payout for a group that tends to contain 
many low earners and greater life expectancy. This means that fewer women annuitants 
will qualify for the MPG than would be the case if they purchased joint annuities.  
 
9 In the mandatory part of the UK system annuities must be indexed up to a ceiling of 5 % 
inflation. Other countries with new multi-pillar systems are considering requiring indexed  
                                                                                                                                                 
annuities, but this may be difficult to implement given the absence of indexed financial 
instruments. 
 
10  It also provides pension insurance for those whose accumulation is not large enough to 
purchase an annuity that equals the MPG, which was its original objective. 
 
11 Ironically, the 1985 tables replaced 1981 tables that had lower mortality assumptions. 
This change  enabled higher PW pensions to be paid in the short run, although it means 
that pensioners will run out of money sooner. 
 
12  Until 1997 the AFP’s real return was averaged over five years. 
 
13  Until 2002 PW pensioners had no portfolio choice and simply had to accept whatever 
the AFP offered. AFP portfolios were heavily invested in fixed income securities, 
especially mortgage-backed securities that paid somewhat more than government bonds, 
but a growing portion was invested in equities. Starting in 2002 pensioners have been 
allowed some control over their portfolios and are permitted to invest up to a maximum 
of 40% in equities.   
 
14  For a proposal to use forward-looking rate of return assumptions for PW, based on the 
term structure, see  PrimAmerica Consultores 2002. 
  
15  The “calce rule” penalizes mismatching of liabilities and assets by requiring higher 
reserves. If long-term rates are much higher than short-term rates, companies sometimes 
engage in a limited amount of mismatch, as part of their investment strategy. 
 
16  Workers with small accumulations, which signal smaller earnings and wealth, are 
likely to have a high subjective discount rate and therefore an even higher relative present 
value of lifetime income under PW, whose payouts are more front-loaded than those of 
annuities. 
 
17   Most of the remainder have other income sources (such as a pension from the old 
system) that make them ineligible for the MPG. Annuitants with low payouts may not get 
the MPG top-up for other reasons as well. Insurance companies may make up small 
differentials themselves, because of the high transactions costs of applying for the public 
subsidy. Early retirees with low annuities don’t get a top-up until they reach normal 
retirement age, and even then they are subject to a lower MPG.  
 
18 The link between early retirement and unemployment has been noted in many 
countries and it does not seem to be fully broken in Chile.  
 
19 Note that in 2001 a typical worker who had earned the average AFP return of 10.7% 
during 1981-2001 would have achieved a 50% replacement rate with a pension that 
exceeded 110% of the MPG by age 45. 
  
                                                                                                                                                 
20 For older workers, the bonos would have been equivalent to several years of 
contributions and could be applied toward the purchase of a pension. This contrasts with 
Argentina, which paid a compensatory pension for prior service and Mexico, which did 
not pay anything but granted workers the right to opt back to the old system upon 
retirement. 
 
21  This proscription may have been due to the regulator’s fear that such purchases would 
set up a conflict of interest between worker and AFP, to the detriment of the pension 
system. Once the market for bonos was well established, its price exogenously 
determined, AFP’s were allowed to buy them and compete for early retirees.  
 
22  Workers (who are required to place their mandatory saving with AFP’s) are charged 
15% of contributions (1.5% of wages), Then, since the average pension is 50% of the 
average wage, the monthly fee for the average pensioner is about one-third that paid by 
the average worker. The average cost per worker is estimated to be 8% of contributions, 
so affiliates are very profitable during the accumulation stage. We do not have data on 
relative costs of worker-contributors and pensioners. Workers may be more expensive 
because they can transfer between AFP’s, hence impose liquidity, marketing and 
switching transactions costs. However, PW pensioners also impose costs on AFP’s. 
Besides sending a monthly check, every year AFP’s must calculate the new PW payout. 
If the payout approaches the MPG level they must handle the paper work for MPG 
eligibility, and verify with other pension funds and tax authorities that there are no other 
income sources for the means test. They pay the full MPG and later get reimbursed by the 
government. Thus, at least for small accounts, administrative costs are likely to be at least 
as great for PW pensioners as for worker contributors.  
 
23  Sales commissions (and probably the accompanying rebates) have declined in recent 
years, making this effect smaller. 
 
24 For example, if the interest rate is 5% and the regulator’s mortality table RV85 is used, 
the actuarial factor would be 12.03 at age 60, 10.62 at age 65. The MPG for the worker 
who retires at 60 is then reduced by (12.03/10.62)-1=13.3%. 
 
25  Once they attain the 20 years needed for MPG eligibility, they may simply take a job 
in the informal sector or as a self-employed worker (where contributions are not required) 
until age 65, since any further private benefits would simply crowd out future public 
benefits. 
 
26 For attempts to simulate future public expenditures see Arenas. 1999, Wagner. 1990 
and Ortuzar . 1998.  However, none of these studies builds these simulations on a cohort 
analysis of past and expected future pensions and estimates of future MPG, as should be 
done. In particular, data on PW pensions by cohort, as well as mortality experience of 
PW pensioners, are not available.  
 
27  We make this rough estimate for a mature system, i.e. one that has been in existence 
for at least 40 years, and we calculate the wage tax that would cover the cost even though  
                                                                                                                                                 
the MPG is, in fact, financed by a broader tax base. We do not know the distribution of 
pension size by age. Hence we make stylized assumptions, based on the data in Tables 13 
and 14. We assume that the “representative” normal age PW retiree has an initial pension 
that is 125% of the MPG. He or she will run out of funds by age 78 and after that the 
government will pay the full MPG—but only to 36% of all PW pensioners since the 
others are still under age 78.  The post-age-70 MPG is 27% of the average wage. Then, if 
it is financed by a payroll tax and if the ratio of contributing workers to retired workers 
(the support ratio) is 2/1, it would cost 27/2*36%=4.9% of payroll to finance this benefit-
-if all pensioners were on PW. But since only 26% of all pensioners are normal age PW 
retirees, the cost for this group would be 1.3% of payroll.  
For annuitants the estimation is more difficult since the dispersion of pension size is 
greater and most annuitants retire early, but we do not have data on dispersion by cohort.  
If the data in Table 9 were relevant for each new cohort, this would suggest that about 
30% of all annuitants start out with an annuity < 110% of MPG and become eligible for 
the MPG top-up by age 70. Another 30% would never qualify for the public benefit 
because their own benefit exceeds 200% of the MPG (Tables 13A and 14A).  
To simplify, we deal with a “representative” annuitant who retires at age 60 or 65 and 
starts receiving a top-up at age 82.  The top-up is only 1% of the MPG at age 82 but by 
age 100 (for the few who are still alive) it is 30% of the MPG.  Thus his average expected 
payment per year is only about 10% of that for the representative PW pensioner described 
above.  But 64% of all pensioners are annuitants, compared with 26% who are normal 
age PW pensioners, and 22% of these are age 82 or over.  Thus the tax cost over all 
annuitants would be 10%*64/26*22/36 that of PW pensioners, or .2% of wages. The total 
cost for normal age PW pensioners plus all annuitants would be 1.5% of payroll. (Based 
on Table 7, we assume that the 9% of retirees who are PW early retirees start out with a 
much larger pension and are unlikely to get any public benefit).  
However, this number is likely to underestimate costs by a large amount, for the 
following reasons: 1) Many PW recipients are women. Their own-accumulations are 
lower than those of men, their normal retirement age is 60 rather than 65--hence they 
deplete their own accounts before the age of 78--and they live much longer than men. 
Therefore, the proportion of women PW pensioners who receive the government subsidy 
in steady state is likely to be much larger than that of men. For example, in a constant 
cohort world half of all women age 60+ will be age 74 or older, at which point they are 
likely to receive the government subsidy. 2) Some PW normal retirees could not have 
purchased a pension = 125% of the MPG initially, and the government payment for this 
group would have begun much earlier than age 78. This applies especially to women. 3) 
RV98 understates life expectancy for women and will do so increasingly for men as well 
as mortality declines. Then, the support ratio will decline and the proportion of 
pensioners who are very old (and hence eligible for the MPG subsidy) will increase. In 
Chile, the government bears a disproportionate amount of this longevity risk. 4) These 
calculations are based on individual pensions rather than on joint pensions. They do not 
include survivors’ benefits for widows. While the husband must allow for a survivor’s 
benefit that is 60% of his own benefit, the government actually guarantees 100%. 
Moreover, women get this benefit for longer, because of their greater longevity. 
Currently the number of widows on PW is 38% the number of primary beneficiaries, a  
                                                                                                                                                 
much higher proportion of these are already receiving the full MPG from the government, 
and many more wives are likely to become widows soon. (Working wives are entitled to 
the full widow’s benefit in addition to their own benefit). 5) Moreover, other survivors 
such as orphans are also excluded in these calculations, but these constitute a much 
smaller amount that do widows. 6) We have assumed constant size cohorts but in reality 
the baby boom generation will be followed by a smaller generation, so the support ratio 
will be lower and the necessary wage tax would be higher. These factors could increase 
the long run cost of the MPG to the equivalent of 2.5-3% of payroll. A full actuarial 
model with more detailed data are needed for a more accurate estimate. 
 
28  Changing indexation provisions is a common reform provision. The UK has kept 
fiscal costs under control by price-indexing its basic benefit, which consequently has 
been falling through time relative to wages so it is now only 16% of the average wage. 
The President’s Commission to Strengthen Social Security in the US recently made two 
alternative proposals regarding indexation of the DB in the US: one proposal would index 
to prices and the other would index to wages adjusted by longevity, which is 
approximately Swiss indexation. 
 
29 The Chilean government is now planning to require a pension that is at least 130% of 
the MPG and 70% of own-wage (but even this may not be enough) and to eliminate 
periods of unemployment from the calculation of the average own-wage. 
 
30 The escalation might match the 2% historical average annual growth in the MPG or 
might escalate at a more modest 1% per year. A 2% escalation might result in too much 
postponement of consumption, given uncertainty about whether wages and MPG will 
really rise at 2% indefinitely. For these reasons, a 1% escalation might be preferable. If 
PW becomes back-loaded while annuities remain level, this will increase the incentive to 
annuitize. 
 
31 This would provide longevity insurance at relatively low cost, if mortality pooling 
began immediately (that is, if the premium is not refundableturned to the estates of 
retirees who die before age 78). 
 
32 The floor would be binding on retirees who start out with annuities less than 180% of 
the MPG. It would reduce the initial pension for this group and thereby discourage their 
early retirement while keeping the long run annuity payment above the MPG.  
 
33  The special pool would ensure that the money goes to these low-wealth annuitants 
(and indirectly to the public treasury) rather than being used to subsidize high-income 
high-longevity annuitants. It would encourage the use of special income-related mortality 
tables and a higher money’s worth ratio for this group than would otherwise transpire if 
broader pooling were used. These low-income annuitants would have little or no 
incentive to choose a low-cost provider, since the government has insured their minimum 
pension at the MPG level and their own accumulation is not large enough to go above 
this amount. Therefore, the government would have to play an important role in 
organizing this market, perhaps auctioning it off to the best bidding insurance company  
                                                                                                                                                 
each year.  Part of the pension would be paid by the company and the remainder, up to 
the MPG level, by the treasury. 
 
34 Insurance company marketing also encourages early retirement, which may be less 
socially useful, by spreading information about eligibility. However, since these 
eligibility rules were set by government and could be changed by government, it would 
seem that government deserves the credit or blame for early retirement. 
  
35 This was also observed in the UK by Murthi et al 1999. Part of this effect in our data 
may be due to the fact that premiums were smaller in the early years of the system, and 
mortality was higher in those years. 